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I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
In response to the need for economic regulation within our 
society, the laws of tort and intellectual property have 
long been applied by successive generations of judges to 
afford protection to the trader whose business suffers as 
a result of the wrongful actions of another. To the 
existing causes of action, namely, conspiracy, intimidation, 
inducing breach of contract, defamation, slander of goods, 
breach of confidence and passing off, must be added the 
statutory relief available under patents, designs, copyright 
d d k 1 . 1 . 1 an tra e mar s egis ation. 
Amongst the arsonal of weapons developed by the courts of 
Common Law and Equity to combat instances of unfair or 
dishonest trading, most protean is that generally described 
as the tort of "passing off". Although the existence of 
this tort raay be traced as far back as the reign of 
Elizabeth I, it is in its present form essentially a modern 
development with further potential for growth and novel 
application . 
This paper will examine the growth and development of the 
tort of passing off in New Zealand since 1979, although 
from time to time cases earlier than 1979 will be referred to. 
Prior to 1979, passing off was a cause of action of which 
little use had been made in New Zealand. 2 However, for 
2. 
reasons to be suggested, there has since been an upsurge 
in passing off litigation. In all, twenty nine cases 
were decided by the New Zealand High Court and Court of 
Appeal between 1979 and August 1985 inclusive. 3 This is 
a phenomenon both deserving of attention in itself and as 
premonitory of the future of the tort. In particular, 
the recent cases presage and indeed at times even confirm 
several new developments in the law of passing off in New 
Zealand. It is suggested that these indicate a more 
sympathetic approach to the trader whose business suffers 
loss or damage and an increasing intolerance of unfair 
competition. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine and judge these 
developments in the broader context of the historical basis 
of the tort and the current approach of other Common Law 
jurisdictions. In Part I, a description of the passing off 
cause of action is followed by suggested reasons for the 
upsurge of passing off cases in New Zealand and a general 
overview of the recent litigation. Part II examines the 
approach of the New Zealand courts to cases in which a 
foreign trader alleges passing off in New Zealand by a local 
trader. Whether or not a tort of "unfair competition" is 
surfacing in New Zealand law, either as distinct from or 
as a modern form of the tort of passing off, is the subject 
of analysis in Part III. In Part IV, the likely effect on 
the cause of action of proposed "fair trading" or trade 
practices legislation is considered. 
• 
3 . 
Attention is focussed on these topics simply because they 
are considered to be the most interesting, although the 
New Zealand cases do provide food for thought on other 
aspects of the cause of action as well.
4 
B. Historical Background and Modern Formulation 
of the Tort of Passing Off 
The first indications of the existence of a Common Law tort 
of passing off were given in the case of Southern v. How 5 
in 1618, in which Doderidge J. mentioned an unreported case 
where the defendant fraudulently counterfeited the mark of 
a clothier from Gloucester. 6 
The action grew out of the Common Law action for deceit 
and required proof of a fraudulent misrepresentation which 
deceived the plaintiff's customers. In the nineteenth 
century it became accepted in equity that an injunction 
could be granted in the absence of an i ntention to deceive 
if potential purchasers would in fact be deceived. 7 Thus 
the basis of the modern principle was stated by Lord Langdale M.R. 
as early as 1842 as being that " [ a ] man is not to sell his 
goods under the pretence that they are the goods of another 
man." 8 
The basi ~ of the action is the plaintiff's proprietary 
interest in the goodwill by his or her business, goods 
or services. The broad concept of goodwill has perhaps 
best been expressed in the words of Lord McNaghten in 
• 
--• 
4. 
Inland Revenue Conunissioners v. Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd.: 
"It is the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation 
and connection of a business. 
which brings in custom. 119 
It is the attractive force 
The action for passing off protects this goodwill, which 
derives from the market recognition of a product or service 
as a result of its distinctive features, from being filched 
by another trader. It prevents one trader from cashing 
in on the goodwill and reputation built up by another and 
thereby edging in on that trader's market, diverting customers 
or inducing in the minds of customers an incorrect belief 
that the two businesses are in some way connected. 
The classic passing off situation involves one trader 
misrepresenting that his or her goods or services are those 
of another. The tort has now been extended to cover a far 
wider range of misrepresentations made in the course of 
conunercial activity, such as (1) that the plaintiff's goods 
of an inferior class or quality are of a superior class or 
l 't 10 qua 1. y; (2) that seconds or rejects of the plaintiff's 
manufacture to which the plaintiff has not applied his or 
11 her mark are goods of the plaintiff's ordinary manufacture; 
(3) that altered or adulterated goods are goods of the 
1 ' 'f f I ' ' 1 f t 12 p ainti s origina manu ac ure; (4) that the defendant 
is a subsidiary of or otherwise connected with the plaintiff 
company; 13 and (5) that the defendant is an authorised 
dealer in the plaintiff's goods. 14 
.. 
• • 
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The damage in each of those situations consists in the 
invasion of the plaintiff's proprietary interest in the 
goodwill of his or her business or a result of the defendant's 
misrepresentation. 
The appropriate test now to be applied in both a classic 
and an extended passing off action is universally accepted 
as that laid down by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink B.V. v. 
1 5 J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. (the Advocaat case).~ 
After reviewing the authorities, His Lordship identified 
five elements which the plaintiff must establish in order to 
l 'd f . f . ff 16 create a va i cause o action or passing o : 
(1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a 
trader in the course of trade, (3) to pros-
pective customers of his or ultimate consu-
mers of goods or services supplied by him, 
(4) which is calculated to injure the 
business or goodwill of another trader (in 
the sense that this is a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence) and (5) which causes 
actual damage to a business or goodwill of 
the trader by whom the action is brought 
or (in a quia timet action) will probably 
do so. 
The action affords the remedies of interlocutory or i nterim 
injunction to the trader wishing to preserve the status quo 
until the dispute has been disposed of on a ful l hearing 
and the remedies of injunction, damages or account of 
profit to the aggrieved trader at the substantive hearing. 
A passing off action may be brought in New Zealand for any 
one or more of several reasons. Where the alleged passing 
off concerns the plaintiff's goods, there may be a registered 
trade mark in respect of those goods and an action for 
6 • 
infringement under the Trade Marks Act 1953 will lie. 17 
This involves a speedy and inexpensive process whereby 
production of the certificate of registration coupled with 
proof of the infringement enable a court to grant the 
remedies of injunction or damages. In contrast, a passing 
off action requires proof of a misrepresentation, dis-
tinctiveness of the plaintiff's goods, goodwill, confusion 
in the minds of customers and actual or likely damage. 
This in turn requires the gathering and production in court 
of much evidence, including a large number of witnesses for 
each side. The expense of a passing off action is a major 
drawback. 
However, a passing off action may be the only avenue of 
relief where there is no registered trade mark in respect 
of the goods or where registration is pending. Indeed, 
under section 6 of the Trade Marks Act no action lies for 
infringement of an unregistered mark, but nothing in the 
section affects the right to maintain an action for passing-
off. Therefore the two actions are not mutually exclusive 
and in fact are sometimes invoked together. But it should 
be noted that success in the one does not necessarily imply 
success in the other. For example, lack of proof of 
goodwill will cause a passing off action to fail but is 
not necessarily an impediment to a successful trade mark 
infringement action. Further, whilst there is no doubt 
that goodwill is a saleable asset, transactions in goodwill 
do not necessarily give rights against third pers9ns, as 
regards passing off. The "purchaser" of the "right" to 
use a certain name acquires no right to sue for passing off 
-• 
unless he or she can show that the use of that name by 
h t t f 1 t t . 18 ot ers amoun s o a a se represen a ion. On the other 
hand, ownership of the registered trade mark and all 
attendant rights to sue for an infringement vest in the 
assignee thereof. 19 A plaintiff may fail to make out a 
case for trade mark infringement because he or she cannot 
prove its registration, or that its registration extends to 
the particular goods in question, or because the registration 
is invalid, and yet may be able to prove that the defendant 
has passed off his or her goods as those of the plaintiff. 20 
A passing off action affords the only relief where it is 
the plaintiff's goodwill in a business name or in the service 
offered that has been damaged. The Trade Marks Act only 
21 applies to goods. Service marks, that is, marks relating 
to business names, "services supplied or services applied 
to goods as distinct from the provision of the goods themselves 11 , 2 : 
1 . bl . 1 d 23 are not current y registra e in New Zea an. Further, 
there is no Business Names Registration Act in New Zealand, 
although the Registrar of Companies does have power under 
section 31(1) of the Companies Act 1955 to refuse incorporat ion 
of a company with a name deceptively similar to that of 
another. 
It has also to be borne in mind that businesses now expend 
enormous sums of money in choosing the right name for their 
product or service and in promoting or advertising it under 
that name. One minute's prime-time advertising on 
televi~ion in New Zealand currently costs between $6 ,ooo and $10 ,ooo. 
Further, with the range of products and services on the 
• 
8. 
market, consumers place considerable reliance on the 
distinctive name or get-up (that is, packaging or appearance) 
of goods or services as indicating their quality, other 
merits or source of manufacture. Clearly there is a 
considerable interest to be protected by a passing off action. 
C. The Recent Upsurge of Passing Off Litigation 
in New Zealand 
In contrast to only nineteen or so reported cases in New 
Zealand since the end of the nineteenth century, twenty 
nine cases of passing off have been decided by the New 
Zealand courts since the beginning of 1979. 24 The majority 
of these have remained unreported and appear to have 
attracted little attention from legal, judicial and academic 
circles. This is unfortunate as we are witnessing the 
emergence of several new trends in the law of passing off . 
In addition, many of the cases reveal judicial attitudes 
to the possibility of a new tort of unfair competition in 
New Zealand, a tort which has the potential for enormous 
impact in the commercial world and which has attracted both 
favourable and adverse comments overseas. 25 
It is difficult to pin-point any one or more reasons for 
this increased litigation. It does not appear to have 
been matched in other Common Law jurisdictions and is 
therefore a purely indigenous phenomenon. Perhaps the 
most realistic explanation is the harsher economic climate 
of this decade, resulting in the need to compete more 
• • 
bi) 
bit 
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fiercely in an increasingly saturated market and to take 
all possible measures to protect one's business goodwill 
and corner of that market. In theory, increased competition 
would indicate the necessity for innovative and distinctive 
names or get-ups for the goods or services offered. But 
in practice it may seem much easier and more immediately 
lucrative to acquire the benefits of an already established 
goodwill by suggesting identity, similarity or connection 
with other successful goods or services . 
There appears to be a greater awareness now of the passing 
off cause of action and intellectual property law in general, 
especially in the context or competition and trade practices 
26 laws. 
Further specific reasons are best suggested following a 
general overview of the recent New Zealand cases. 
With only few exceptions, the main parties to the litigated 
cases were incorporated companies. This simply reflects 
the fact that the misrepresentation giving rise to a 
passing off action must, on the traditional Advocaat 
formulation, be made by a trader in the course of trade. 
It also reflects the obvious fact that most businesses are 
carried on by companies. "Trader" is, however, a term 
widely interpreted. It includes persons engaged in 
professional, literary or artistic occupations, incorporated 
or unincorporated associations and other professional bodies, 
even though these are not engaged in trade in the literal 
27 sense of the word. In such cases, the goodwill capable 
-• • 
blJ 
• • 
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of being damaged consists of the plaintiff's reputation 
and goodwill in its commercial dealings with third parties. 
It is interesting to note that in a cause of action 
originally designed to protect the goodwill subsisting 
in goods, just over half of the New Zealand cases involved 
alleged passing off of the plaintiff's business name or 
service offered. Had service marks been registrable in 
New Zealand, the number of actions concerning business 
names or services might not have been so high . On the 
other hand, in only one of the cases concerning goods were 
d . f t d k . f . 1 . · d 28 procee ings or ra e mar in ringement a so institute. 
In 1983, the New Zealand Industrial Property Advisory 
CoITu~ittee responded to submissions received from private 
sector bodies and patent attorneys in recommending to the 
Minister of Justice that the Trade Marks Act 1953 and Trade 
Marks Regulations 1954 be amended to allow for registration 
f . k 29 o service mar s. This would be done by following the 
recent Australian amendments whereby the words "or services" 
would be inserted after the word "goods" wherever the latter 
. h 30 appears in t e Act. Despite the additional recommendation 
that the legislative provisions be put into place so that 
they could be rendered operative as soon as practicably 
possible, 31 the Committee's Report has not yet engendered 
a legislative response. It is submitted that the proportion 
of passing off cases brought in respect of services confirms 
the need for such an amendment. 
-• • 
bi] 
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In the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff sought and 
obtained an interim injunction to restrain the defendant's 
passing off pending the substantive hearing of the action. 
In only one of these did a substantive hearing of the 
1 . . f . . . 11 3 2 app ication or a permanent inJunction actua y eventuate. 
The reason for this, as referred to in several cases, 33 is 
that there is little point in litigating several months later 
where the grant of an interim injunction has forced a change 
of name or get-up. Trade cannot come to a halt pending 
decision on the substantive application. A new name or 
get-up has to be found. This will involve further expense, 
new promotional campaigns and creation of a new image which 
it would usually be inconceivable to rectify or discard 
should the substantive hearing be decided differently from 
the interim hearing. Although the damages which would be 
obtained, should the defendant ultimately win, would compensate 
for the extra financial outlay, business goodwill and 
reputation cannot be founded upon a constantly changing 
name or product. As concerns the plaintiff, there will be 
no point in prolonging the proceedings, provided he or she 
acted promptly and before great financial damage occurred. 
So in passing off cases, an interim hearing is highly likely 
to determine the final outcome of the matter. It will 
seldom be worth the parties' while to fight the proceedings 
through to the end so as to conclusively establish the 
justice of the matter. 
In this regard, there may be an argument that the recent 
New Zealand cases should not be accorded much weight, being 
mostly interim decisions. But this must be balanced 
12. 
against the fact that their likelihood of finally 
settling the dispute means that the court must pay greater 
regard to the likelihood or otherwise of one party rather 
than the other succeeding in the substantive action. That 
is, the court must be more than satisfied that there is a 
"serious question to be tried" 34 There is overseas 
authority that this approach to the granting of interim 
relief is particularly relevant in a passing off action. 35 
As to the recent New Zealand practice of granting interim 
relief in passing off actions, the remarks of Cooke J., 
delivering the Court of Appeal's judgment in the most recent 
passing off case, Harvest Bakeries Ltd. and Ors. v. 
Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd., 36 should be noted. In 
dismissing an appeal against the grant of an interim 
injunction in the High Court, 37 the Court did accept the 
appellant's argument that 38 
an over-mechanical following in the High Court 
of New Zealand of the two-stage approach 
enunciated in American Cyanamid Co. v. 
Ethicon Ltd .... has resulted in plaintiffs 
in passing off and other actions obtaining 
too easily injunctions which, although 
nominally interim, have had the effect of 
putting an end to the litigation. 
The Court considered that "this is at least a danger against 
which it is necessary to guard" and that a prompt hearing 
of the action itself is· preferable to an interlocutory 
. . . h . 39 1nJunct1on earing. 
Also to be noted are the proceedings in Noel Leeming 
Television Ltd. and Ors. v. Noel's Appliance Centre Ltd., 40 
in which an application for an interim injunction was, by 
13. 
consent,not proceeded with on the ground that the opposed 
interim hearing would involve issues almost exactly the 
same as those to be resolved in the final action. 
The judgments in the cases indicate that the elements of 
the cause of action which the plaintiffs had the most 
difficulty in satisfying are the distinctiveness of the 
goods or services and the existence of business goodwill. 41 
This is not, however, peculiar to the New Zealand jurisprudence. 
Indeed, goodwill and distinctiveness are, along with the 
fact of a misrepresentation, the core elements of a passing 
off action. 
Whilst it is now well settled that success in a passing off 
action does not require proof of a dishonest, improper or 
otherwise fraudulent intention on the part of the defendant, 
the fact that in slightly more than half of the New Zealand 
cases allusion or even express reference was made by the 
judge to the defendant's improper intention is highl~significant. 
J 
It is submitted that this confirms the statement that 
"passing off is unfair competition par excellence 11 • 42 
From this general overview of the cases, two further reasons 
may be suggested for the increase in passing off litigation 
since 1979. The first is that companies and their legal 
advisers may be relying on the fact that the likelihood of 
the case proceeding past an interim hearing is slight. 
Accordingly, the effort, time and expense involved may not 
necessarily always be as great as initially appears. The 
second reason is that further litigation may be encouraged 
by the overwhelming success of previous actions. Relief 
14. 
was granted in twenty five of the twenty nine cases. 
Success appears all the more probable where the defendant 
has been actuated by an improper or dishonest motive. 
Before proceeding to analysis of various features of 
the cases and new developments in the cause of action, 
it must be remembered that passing off being the "most 
43 protean of torts" and an "instrument of economic 
regulation 1144 requires the legal critic to maintain an open 
mind. That is, new developments in the action and judicial 
attitudes thereto should not be condemned simply because 
of their very novelty. They must be evaluated in the 
context both of the historical nature and purpose of the 
tort and of the role which it is expected to fulfil now 
and in the future. 
II PASSING OFF AND FOREIGN TRADERS REPUTATION SLOPOVER 
Perhaps of greatest interest in recent passing off litigation 
is the courts' approach to the foreign plaintiff who alleges 
passing off in New Zealand by a local trader. With the 
ever-increasing trading activities of multinational 
corporations attracting judicial attention worldwide, 
this aspect of the cause of action, although relevant in 
only a minority of cases, is extremely important. This is 
so not only because of the huge sums of money involved, but 
also because ot the typical pattern of international 
marketing whereby a product or service successful on the 
domestic market is subsequently launched internationally. 
In order to establish the misrepresentation required to 
found a passing off action, the foreign plaintiff, usually 
a corporate body, will have to prove that it enjoys a 
distinctive reputation in New Zealand. Proof of this is 
not usually difficult; however, it does not suffice. 
As passing off protects a trader's proprietary interest in 
the goodwill attaching to his or her business which has been 
or is likely to be damaged, the plaintiff must prove that 
there is a goodwill capable of being damaged. 
The classic definition of "goodwill" should be recalled here: 
"It is the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation 
and connection of a business. It is the attractive force 
h . h b . . 1145 w ic rings in custom. 
Although goodwill usually runs hand in hand with reputation, 
goodwill and reputation are not identical concepts. 
Reputation is a factual matter which the plainti f f is required 
to prove in order to establish that the conduct complained of 
. . . 46 
constitutes a misrepresentation. At the same time, it 
should be noted that damage to a reputation will often 
indicate damage to goodwill. It is for this reason that the 
two terms are often used either interchangeably or conjunctively. 
To understand - the difference be t ·d2e n '-he two concepts is all 
the more important in a passing off action brought by a 
foreign trader, who may well enjoy an overseas reputation.
47 
The major difficulty will often lie in establishing that the 
16. 
trader has also goodwill in the place where the alleged 
passing off is occurring. As shall be seen in the following 
sections, the differing approaches of the courts to the 
concept of goodwill have as a corollary differing approaches 
to the concept of reputation. 
The authorities agree that some sort of trading activity in 
the jurisdiction is evidence of goodwill and a reputation 
entitled to protection. However, they disagree as to the 
extent of trading required to prove goodwill. Two schools 
0£ thought are apparent. According to the traditional or 
''hardline" approach, a business has no goodwill in the 
jurisdiction of the court whose protection it seeks unless 
it sells goods or offers services there. On the other hand, 
courts adopting the liberal approach have granted relief to 
a plaintiff who has no actual place of business in the 
court's jurisdiction. 
A. The Traditional Approach 
On this approach, goodwill is a purely local concept. 
An extreme example is Alain Bernardin et Cie. v. Pavilion 
?roperties Ltd., 48 in which the Paris-based "Crazy Horse 
Saloon" nightclub failed in a passing off action against 
a London restaurant which began operating and advertising 
under the same name. Despite advertising by the plaintiffs 
in ~nglish travel agencies and evidence of confusion amongst 
the English public, the plaintiffs, having no office or 
17. 
booking facilities in London, were held to have no protectable 
goodwill in England. 
The decision was followed in Amway Corporation v. Eurway 
International Ltd., 49 in which Brightman J. refused inter-
locutory relief to an American company which had publicised 
an intention to trade in England but had engaged in only 
minor trading activity there. 
In The Athlete's Foot Marketing Associates Inc. v. Cobra 
d 
50 · . h b . f . Sports Lt., an American company in t e usiness o granting 
franchises world-wide to independent shoe retailers failed in 
its motion for an interlocutory injunction against a 
prospective English franchisee which opened a store called 
"Athlete's Foot Bargain Basement". Walton J. expressly 
recognised the existence of the two schools of thought but 
held that a substantial user in England had not been established. 
The traditional approach to goodwill, as evidenced by these 
cases and others, was confirmed recently by the English 
Court of Appeal in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky 
Budvar NP and Ors. 51 After reviewing the authorities, 
and relying on the Advocaat and Athlete's Foot cases, 
Oliver L.J. held that "goodwill (as opposed to mere 
reputation) does not exist apart from a business carried on 
here. 1152 In that case, the plaintiff, who advertised 
extensively throughout the United States, supplied beer to 
American diplomats and servicemen and to British employees 
at a large military base in England and had some small outlets 
in American-style restaurants and clubs. 
The plaintiff's action to restrain passing off failed. 
According to Oliver and Dillon L.J.J., the plaintiff had 
no business in England to which goodwill could attach, sales 
in the embassy and military base being merely a sort of extra-
territorial extension of the established American business and 
goodwill. O'Connor L.J. reached the same result by reasoning 
that as the defendants had not and could not enter the 
plaintiff's restricted market, no actual damage or likelihood 
thereof had been established. 
It is submitted that this decision is questionable, at least 
as regards the majority reasoning. There was no indication 
that prospective purchasers of the defendants' beer could not 
equally be customers of the plaintiff, who may have been 
deceived into believing that the beer sold on the open market 
was that of the plaintiff. Moreover, had the defendants 
been able to sell beer within the plaintiff's restricted 
market, although the chances of this were very remote, it would 
be absurd to deny relief to the plaintiffs on the ground that 
they had no protectable goodwill in England. 
B. The Liberal Approach 
Despite the decisions in the above cases based upon a 
traditional approach to the concepts of goodwill and reputation, 
judgments in two of the cases contain statements which, it is 
submitted, also support the liberal approach adopted in other 
cases. 
19. 
In the Athlete's Foot case, Walton J., after citing the 
example of the Bedouin trader setting himself up in the 
middle of the desert as "Harrods", went on to say that53 
... as a matter of principle, no trader can 
complain of passing off against him in any 
territory, and it will usually be defined 
by national boundaries, although it is well 
conceivable in the modern world that it will 
not - in which he has no customers, nobody 
who is in a trade relationship with him. 
(Emphasis added) 
And in discussing the decision of the Privy Council in 
54 Star Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Yap Kwee Kor that there could 
be no goodwill without a business in the country to which 
the goodwill could be attached, Walton J. said: 55 
I do not understand [His Lordship ] to be laying 
down the proposition that the trader must himself 
be personally present in some· shape or form in a 
particular territory. 
In the earlier case of IRC v. Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd., 
after defining goodwill, Lord McNaghten proceeded to state: 
To analyse goodwill and split it up into its 
component parts, to pare it down ... until nothing 
is left but a dry residuum ingrained in the actual 
place where the business is carried on while every-
thing else is in the air, seems to me to be as useful 
for practical purposes as it would be to resolve the 
human body into the various substances of which it 
is said to be composed. The goodwill of a business 
is one whole ... 
This is some recognition that goodwill does not necessarily 
exist only in the place where business is carried on and 
further, that it may be artificial to distinguish thus 
between the goodwill and reputation of a business. 
56 
In any event,an equally authoritative and, it is submitted, 
more realistic line of cases has adopted a liberal approach 
to goodwill. 
In Panhard et Levassor v. Panhard Levassor Motor Co., 57 English 
customers purchased French cars in France and brought them 
back to England. Despite having no place of business in 
England, the French plaintiffs were held to have a reputation 
and a market in England which the Court would protect against 
passing off. 
. t P . 58 . . h d In Poire v. oiret, a Paris couturier a customers but 
no place of business in England. It is unclear whether any 
sales ever took place there, but there had once been a show 
of his dresses at 10 Downing Street, London. He succeeded 
in his action against a local trader for passing off by the 
use of "Poiret". 
In Sheraton Corporation of America v. Sheraton Motels Ltd., 59 
the plaintiffs owned a chain of hotels worldwide. There was 
evidence as to advertising reaching England and bookings were 
taken i~ England at an office kept by the plaintiffs. An 
injunction was obtained against Sheraton Motels Ltd. which 
proposed to set up a hotel in England, the Court observing 
that there could only be one reason for the defendant's 
choice of the name "Sheraton". 
At the extreme is Maxim's Ltd. v. Dye, 60 in which an injunction 
was granted to the Parisian restaurant "Maxim's'' to restrain 
another company from using the name for its restaurant in 
21. 
Norwich, England. The Crazy Horse case was said to be 
unduly narrow and it was held that if a reputation could 
be established in another territory the possibility that 
business might be carried out in that territory in the 
future was a sufficient basis for protection. The same 
criticism of the Crazy Horse decision was made by the 
Supreme Court of Ireland in C & A Modes v. C & A (Waterford) Ltd.61 
62 This was followed in the Rib Shack case, where a statement 
of claim was not struck out, the plaintiffs having a sub-
stantial reputation and having made substantial preparations 
for trade in England. 
Finally, in Metric Resources Corporation v. Leasemetrix Ltd., 63 
a substantial American company carrying on the business of 
hiring electronic equipment under the name "Leasametric" 
successfully restrained the defendant company from trading 
under the name "Leasernetrix". The evidence showed a strong 
element of locality in the hiring business and the plaintiff 
had no place of business in the United Kingdom. Megarry V.C. 
rejected the view that the owner of a business carried on 
outside the court's jurisdiction could establish no protectable 
goodwill within the jurisdiction before beginning to trade there. 
Other Common Law jurisdictions have followed the English and 
Irish courts in the adoption of a liberal approach. 
The realities of international commerce were accepted in the 
Hong Kong case of Wienerwald Holdings A.G. v. Kwan, 64 but 
Leonard J. refused the application for an interlocutory 
22. 
injunction on the ground that the relevant section of the 
public was only a very small proportion of the Hong Kong 
population. This appears questionable since in a passing 
off case regard must always be had to the relevant section 
of the public, not the entire public at large. It was from 
that small section of the public that both parties contemplated 
drawing their customers. 
A liberal attitude to the question of goodwill and sufficient 
user was also adopted in 1929 by the High Court of Australia 
in Turner v. General Motors (Australia) Pty. Ltd., 65 where 
advertising and commencement of the erection of a factory 
for the American plaintiff was considered sufficient to 
enable it to restrain passing off. Isaacs J. appears to 
have taken the view that it would not have mattered if the 
plaintiff had not had any business activities in Australia. 66 
And in B.M. Auto Sales Pty. Ltd. v. Budget Rent A Car Systems 
67 Pty. Ltd., the erosion of the Crazy Horse decision was noted. 
It was held that the presence in Darwin of a number of the 
plaintiff~ customers, who had travelled there from other 
states where the plaintiff traded, was sufficient to show 
a protectable goodwill and reputation in the Northern Territory. 
The most extreme departure from the Crazy Horse traditional 
approach is the decision of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales in Fletcher Challenge Ltd. v. Fletcher Challenge Pty. Ltd., 68 
upon which the New Zealand courts have recently relied. 69 The 
plaintiff was the result of an amalgamation of three well-
known New Zealand companies. Following news of this 
amalgamation, which was relayed to the Sydney Stock Exchange 
and was reported in several Australian newspapers and 
financial journals, the promoters of the defendant company 
on the same day applied for reservation of the name 
"Fletcher Challenge Pty. Ltd." When two months later 
the plaintiff's solicitors sought to register the newly 
formed company they were informed that the name was no 
longer available. The plaintiff had not yet carried on any 
business in Australia but the companies which had amalgamated 
to form it had had Australian shareholders and subsidiaries. 
Nor had the defendant company traded, being merely a shelf 
company established for the obvious purpose of sale to the 
1 . . ff h. h · 70 p ainti company at a ig price. 
Powell J. granted the plaintiff company an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain this passing off, stating that it was 
legitimate to treat it as entitled to the amalgamated goodwill 
of the three former companies, but that in any event the real 
question was whether the plaintiff had the necessary reputation, 
rather than whether it carried on business in Australia. 
Particular reliance was placed upon all the decisions not 
following Crazy Horse, as well as on the case of Suhner & Co.A.G. 
d 71 · · 1 . h' h . . . h d v. Suhner Lt., a simi ar case in w ic an inJunction a 
been granted to restrain the activities of a company which 
had been formed for no other purpose than to block the 
registration of the plaintiff company in the United Kingdom. 
The significance of the Court in Fletcher Challenge opting 
for the liberal approach and the reasoning and authorities 
upon which the decision is based have been picked up in four 
recent decisions of the High Court of New Zealand, confirming 
24. 
that at least in this part of the world, the goodwill of 
a business is not restricted to the territory in which it 
72 is carried on. 
The approach of the New Zealand courts is not, however, 
surprising. A premonitory hint of the approach to be 
adopted was given in the 1933 case of G.J. Coles & Co. Ltd. 
v. G.J. Coles (NZ) Ltd. and Ors. 73 The plaintiff company 
was a large and prosperous commercial house with headquarters 
in Australia. It operated throughout all the Australian 
states, except for Tasmania, a chain of stores known as 
"Coles' Stores 11 • The defendant was a small private company 
engaged in the mail order business in New Zealand, trading 
under the same "Coles" name. Although Herdman J. found 
ample justification for deciding that the plaintiff's 
business and its general reputation were known to some extent 
in business circles, His Honour found that it had no business 
worth speaking of in New Zealand. Other than a small number 
of shareholders resident in New Zealand, its connection with 
New Zealand commercial life was limited to some insignificant 
. 1 d t' 74 iso ate transac ions. 
His Honour stated initially that if the Australian company 
had an established business in New Zealand, there could be 
no doubt that the defendant company could be restrained in 
. . . . 75 its activities. He then went on to say that there were 
"special circumstances" in the case and that the plaintiff 
was bound to prove that it had a reputation which had 
extended to New Zealand. 76 Evidence as to this was accepted. 
• • • • • 
Reference was made to the approach of the Poiret and 
77 
Panhard Levassor cases and then to a group of cases 
deciding that where fraud is proved the court will assume 
that there is passing off and that a probability of deception 
exists even though it is slight.
78 Dishonesty on the part 
of the defendants was proved. However, because the plaintiff 
had only a reputation in New Zealand, the intention to deceive 
could not be regarded as implying a tangible probability of 
damage. 79 
It must be admitted that this is an unusual approach to a 
case involving a foreign trader. But its significance for 
the present analysis is that Herdman J. would have been 
prepared to find damage to the business goodwill of a plaintiff 
who had merely an overseas reputation in New Zealand. What 
obstructed that finding was that because the plaintiff had 
only a reputation in New Zealand, a likelihood of damage could 
not be established. 
Further support for the liberal approach was given in 1977 
by Chilwell J. in Gallagher Ltd. v. International Brands Ltd.
80 
After reviewing the authorities, His Honour said:
81 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities 
that advertising alone without user whether 
the advertising be within New Zealand or 
'slops over' from abroad is insufficient to 
establish reputation without actual user of 
the common law trademark here. But the 
cases also indicate that the user may be 
slight indeed . 
The later definitive approach of the New Zealand courts was 
also pre-empted by Speight J. in the 1981 case of Armoured 
Transport & Security Services Ltd. and Mayne Nickless Ltd. 
" • • 
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v. Rhino Securities Ltd. 82 The case concerned passing off 
of goods and services in the security industry by adoption 
of the name "Armourgard ". 
The second plaintiff was a very large and well known 
Australian company carrying on business in security services. 
It owned 24 per cent of the parent company of the first 
plaintiff, also a New Zealand company. Having decided to 
grant interim relief on the basis that there was a prima facie 
case of passing off likely to damage the goodwill of the first 
plaintiff, Speight J. proceeded to make the following obiter 
statement: 83 
There is also an alternative and equally valid 
line of approach, namely, that the international 
reputation of Mayne Nickless was known to persons 
in the industry as was its association with the 
name Armaguard, and that that association with 
the First Plaintiff had spilled over into this 
country because of the known co-relation of the 
two companies. There seems room for concluding 
that the opinions put forward by deponents in the 
Plaintiff's material would be a justifiable 
conlusion that Armourgard was associated with 
the First Plaintiff's business via its 
association with the name Armaguard and the 
Australian connection. 
Admittedly, Speight J. was not there saying that the goodwill 
of the Australian second plaintiff was likely to be damaged, 
but rather, that the suggested international association 
was likely to damage the first plaintiff's business. 
The significant point is that His Honour was prepared to 
accept the possibility of a business having an international 
reputation capable of spilling over into New Zealand, although 
no authorities were cited in support. 
• • 
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The last New Zealand case to be noted before examining the 
recent decisions confirming the adoption of the liberal 
approach is the 1981 case of Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. 
84 Totara Lodge Ltd.. The plaintiff was a corporation 
organised and existing under the laws of the Principality 
of Liechtenstein and carrying on business in the Commonwealth 
of the Bahamas. It produced a white rum marketed under the 
style of "Bacardi" for which it enjoyed worldwide sales 
including sales in New Zealand. It had also registered 
the "Bacardi" trade mark in New Zealand . 
The defendant company was a hotel proprietor carrying on 
business in Trentham. The plaintiff obtained an interim 
injunction restraining the defendant from passing off, by 
means of substitution, a certain "Cockspur" rum as "Bacardi" 
rum. 
With respect to Ongley J., the decision must be regarded as 
unsatisfactory, although the result cannot be disputed. 
Despite the plaintiff being a foreign trader, not one 
reference ·was made in the judgment to the difficulties this 
can engender or to the authorities for the traditional and 
liberal approaches to goodwill. Although the facts 
satisfied damage to goodwill on both approaches, the 
plaintiff having actually sold its product in New Zealand, 
His Honour appears to have no more than assumed that a 
f6reign plaintiff trading internationally has a protectable 
goodwill in New Zealand. 
• • 
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c. Recent New Zealand Decisions 
The first three cases, Green, Esanda and Crusader Oil, did 
not expressly disagree with the traditional view and, moreover, 
satisfied on their facts its requirements. However, the 
approach adopted culminated in the following observation by 
Jeffries J. in Crusader Oil: 85 
New Zealand and Australian courts must be prepared 
by their equity decisions to apply the principles 
to the way this part of the world is developing. 
Whilst admiring the judgments in Anheuser-Busch Inc . 
... which may have resolved the territorial nature 
of goodwill in the United Kingdom it still does 
not necessarily provide a solution for us. 
Our path is being laid by cases such as 
Fletcher and the judgment of Casey J. in Esanda . 
In the most recent Budget Rent A Car case, Vautier J. reviewed 
at length the authorities for the two schools of thought and 
86 expressly decided to follow the liberal approach. 
Fundamental to all four decisions are the views expressed 
by Graham J. in the English case of Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. 
87 v. Gutman, in which, although adverting to the difficulty 
of establishing reputation without user, he stated that: 88 
Some businesses are, however, to a greater 
or lesser extent truly international in 
character and the reputation and goodwill 
attaching to them cannot in fact help being 
international also. Some national boundaries, 
such as, for example, those between members of 
the E.E.C. are in this respect becoming ill-
defined and uncertain as modern travel and 
Community rules make the world grow smaller ... 
I believe myself that the true legal position 
is ... that the existence and extent of the 
plaintiffs' reputation and goodwill in every 
case is one of fact however it may be proved 
and whatever it is based on. 
• -• • • • • 
1. Green v. Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand 
The plaintiff was widely known in the United Kingdom and other 
parts of Europe as the creator, producer and "frontman" of 
a television talent quest show entitled "Opportunity Knocks", 
broadcast from the 1960s to 1978. The show had never been 
transmitted in New Zealand nor was there any likelihood of 
its being so in the future. There was no evidence that a 
significant body of New Zealand television viewers even knew 
of the plaintiff or his "Opportunity Knocks". From 1975 
to 1978 South Pacific Television broadcast a locally-produced 
show similar to that of the plaintiff and bearing the same 
title . The plaintiff failed in his action for, inter alia, 
passing off. There was no goodwill subsisting in New Zealand
89 
nor, if there had been, would the viewing public have been 
deceived into believing that the defendant's show was that 
of the plaintiff or was an adaptation thereof authorised or 
approved by the plaintiff.
90 
The significance of the case is the statement that a television 
production is particularly susceptible to the attribute of 
a goodwill which is international in character.
91 It is 
submitted that had a greater section of the public known of 
the plaintiff and his production, Ongley J. would have been 
satisfied as to the existence of a goodwill in New Zealand, 
without the programme necessarily having been broadcast here.
92 
However, the plaintiff would still have failed in his motion 
for an injunction as other requirements of the passing off 
cause of action had not been satisfied. The plaintiff 
may thus be said to have won on the law but lost on the facts.
93 
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Esanda4 and ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd. v. 
Esanda Finance Ltd. 
The first plaintiff was an Australian finance company 
incorporated in 1955, wholly owned by the second plaintiff, 
the ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd. It had no direct presence 
in New Zealand, but considerable evidence was accepted as 
to its financial involvement with local residents and 
companies and other activities here, as well as its reputation 
in New Zealand financial circles. 
The defendant finance company was incorporated in New Zealand 
in 1982 by a Swiss businessman. He sought unsuccessfully 
to explain his choice of the name as a desire to emphasise 
his European background in conjunction with the company's 
New Zealand location and operations. It was, he said, an 
abbreviation of "Euro-Swiss and Australasian Finance Ltd.". 
In granting an interim injunction to restrain passing off 
by the defendant company that it belonged to or was associated 
with the plaintiffs, Casey J. reviewed the authorities and stated 
that94 
a party with no commercial or marketing presence 
in New Zealand cannot gain protection of its 
business name here, no matter how substantial 
its world or local reputation. Only the 
goodwill attaching to its business in this 
country will be protected ... 
His Honour accepted that reputation plus some market activity 
in the jurisdiction, although the evidence of it may be weak, 
is enough to establish a protectable business goodwill. 95 
His Honour was satisfied that the publicity given to the 
• • 
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first plaintiff's name and connections, both directly in 
New Zealand and "slopping over'' from Australian advertising 
and contacts, was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of reputation among people who count in the local 
financial and business world. 96 
In reaching this decision, His Honour noted specifically 
that the extract cited above from the Baskin-Robbins case 
"has special relevance to the current and developing 
commercial relationship between Australia and New Zealand 11 , 97 
in particular where the plaintiff is a finance company 
enjoying a truly international reputation. 
Although the entire judgment is framed in terms of deciding 
only the motion for an interlocutory injunction, it is 
submitted that this does not greatly affect its weight. 
Obviously the decision was correct on its facts and, as Casey J. 
said, it accords with the reality of the commercial relationship 
between New Zealand and Australia whereby national boundaries 
are becoming less important with the desire for unity and 
co-operation. This point shall be pursued in relation to 
the discussion of the following High Court decision, 
Crusader Oil . 
3. Crusader Oil NL and Anor. v. Crusader 
Minerals NZ Ltd. 
The plaintiffs, both part of the "Crusader" group of 
companies, had long been involved in oil and mineral 
31.A . 
exploration in both Australia and New Zealand. Their 
undertaking was successful on Australasian standards and 
enjoyed on international reputation. Their New Zealand 
involvement included negotiations for the purchase of 
mines, exploration agreements with New Zealand interests, 
the holding of local permits and the drilling of wells. 
The defendant, incorporated as a private company in 1982 
and later floated as a public company, was to be involved 
in mineral exploration, with the ultimate aim of moving into 
the oil and gas exploration field. 
The plaintiffs succeeded in their action against the 
defendant company for passing itself off as part of the 
Crusader group. The defendant by its personnel was unable 
to provide any satisfactory reason for its adoption of the 
name "Crusader". 
Clearly, goodwill in New Zealand was established. However, 
the decision would have been the same had this not been so 
obvious, in view of the statement that
98 
New Zealand and Australia historically 
have a common affinity ... it is so obvious 
that it can rest on the assertion. That 
affinity is growing and has been 
immeasurably stimulated by the C.E.R. Treaty. 
The analogy with cases such as Maxim's Ltd. v. Dye, which 
recognised the impact of the E.E.C. Treaty on establishing 
goodwill and reputation in Community Member States, cannot 
be overlooked. 
The Court's approach is clearly supported by the terms of 
the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
99 h . h b . . h bl b . . Agreement, w ic egins in t e Pream e y citing the 
foundations and objectives of the association: 
Conscious of their longstanding and close 
historic, political, economic and geographic 
relationship; 
Recognising that the further development 
of this relationship will be served by the 
expansion of trade and the strengthening 
and fostering of links and co-operation ... ; 
... Bearing in mind their commitment to an 
outward looking approach to trade ... 
Reference is also made to the wider trans-Tasman market. 
The objectives are specifically set out in Article 1: 
(a) to strengthen the broader relation_ 
ship between Australia and New 
Zealand; 
(b) to develop closer economic relations 
between the Member States through a 
mutually beneficial expansion of free 
trade between New Zealand and Australia; 
(c) to eliminate barriers to trade between 
Australia and New Zealand in a gradual 
••• ( d) 
and progressive manner ... ; 
to develop trade between New Zealand 
and Australia under conditions of 
fair competition ... 
In the passing off context, these objectives could only 
properly be pursued by the adoption of the liberal approach 
to goodwill whereby, for example, evidence of reputation and 
some goodwill in New Zealand, coupled with much trading 
activity in Australia, would constitute sufficient evidence 
of goodwill in New Zealand. Any other approach would impose 
a barrier to achieving a close relationship and would impede 
the expansion of free and fair trade between the two countries. 
1 
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Further, under Article 18(a), nothing in the Agreement shall 
preclude the adoption by either Member State of measures 
necessary to protect intellectual or industrial property 
rights or to prevent unfair, deceptive or misleading practices. 
By implication, the adoption of measures (viz., the traditional 
approach to goodwill) which enable such practices to proceed 
unchecked, would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaty. 
4. Budget Rent A Car Systems Pty. Ltd. and Ors. 
v. Mutual Rental Cars Ltd. and Anor. 
The "complex and in many instances devious commercial 
activities" giving rise to this most recent High Court 
decision involving foreign traders have already been the 
subject of extensive litigation in New Zealand and Australia. 100 
Although at the time the decision was handed down there was 
t . 11 l d . l O l . ' s i one appea pen ing, Vautier J. appears to nave put 
an end, at least as regards passing off in New Zealand, to 
the trans-Tasman and trans-Pacific battle between rental car 
102 companies seeking to secure the New Zealand market. 
The parties are some of the main corporate organisations 
engaged in New Zealand and internationally in the business 
of rental car franchisors and operators. 
The second plaint .i. .i:f, ·•nuctqet US", carried on an international 
business of franchising whereby independently owned rental 
car companies were permitted to use the business name "Budget 
Rent A Car" and the Budget logo and uniforms. 
n 
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The first plaintiff, "Budget Australia", was incorporated 
in New South Wales. The controlling shareholder of its 
holding company, Mr E.E. Mcillree, had developed a pattern 
for purloining the names of well-known international companies. 
By 1968, Budget Australia had established a link with a New 
Zealand travel agency and when this collapsed, a New Zealand-
domiciled rental car company, Dominion Rentals Ltd., became 
its agent in this country. 
The defendants, "Mutual Avis NZ", were both subsidiaries of 
a New Zealand company, Mutual Rental Holdinqs Ltd., of which 
a Mr Coxhead was Managing Director and Chief Executive. 
The second defendant operated as a branch, under the "Budget" 
name, a depot in Auckland, with which these proceedings were 
principally concerned. All other business of the defendants 
was conducted under the Mutual Avis name. 
Mutual Avis NZ claimed to have the legal right to use the 
Budget name in New Zealand on the basis of a 1969 agreement. 
Under this agreement, Avis US purported to acquire from 
Mcillree and Avis Australia the right, inter alia, to use 
the Avis and Budget names in New Zealand. Vautier J., 
however, found that neither Mcillree nor Avis Australia nor 
Avis US had established any reputation or goodwill in the 
Budget name in New Zealand. Accordingly, there were no 
rights to this name in New Zealand to seli. 103 
Following execution of this deed, a franchise agreement 
was entered into by Avis US and Mutual Avis NZ in pursuance 
of which Mutual Avis NZ took over the Auckland depot and in 
: 
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1971 there commenced business under the name "Budget 
Rent A Car", with the same logo and patterns as the Budget 
Australia operation. The front of these premises looked 
exactly like a Budget Australia office, although most of the 
hire agreements were entered into in the name of Mutual Avis . 
In 1975, a franchise agreement was concluded between Budget US 
and Budget Australia, under which Budget Australia became 
a representative of Budget US for the purpose of granting 
franchises for the ''Budget System" in the Pacific and the 
Far East. 
Meanwhile, Budget Australia had developed further its interests 
in New Zealand. It inserted advertisements in the Yellow 
Pages of the main telephone directories as well as engaging 
in other publicity. It had also become one of the largest 
rental car operators in Australia. In 1977, it entered into 
a franchise agreement with the New Zealand company Dominion 
Rental Cars Ltd. 
The third plaintiff, "Budget NZ'' was formed to acquire the 
assets of Dominion Rent A Car Ltd., in receivership. It 
carried on Dominion's rental car business, employing Budget 
Australia to run the actual operations. A sub-franchise 
agreement was entered into by these two companies in 1984. 
Vautier J. found that the principal reason why Mutual Avis NZ 
should want to continue to use the Budget name for a very small 
branch of its operations was simply to seek thereby to block 
Budget US and Budget Australia from extending their business 
• • 
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into New Zealand. There was no doubt in His Honour's 
mind but that this was done also with the object of obtaining 
the benefit of the trans-Tasman goodwill of the Australian 
company and the international goodwill of the American 
104 company . 
Vautier J. also found that Mutual Avis had not established 
any reputation or goodwill in New Zealand in the Budget 
name. On the other hand, Budget Australia had advertised 
extensively its business in New Zealand and had entered into 
contracts with New Zealanders for the hire of cars in 
1 . 105 Austra ia. 
Substantial evidence was adduced showing that the public was 
being confused and misled into believing that Mutual Avis' 
"Budget" operation was connected with Budget US and Budget 
Australia. Damage to the plaintiffs' business was also 
clearly established. 
The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, an injunction to restrain 
the defendants from passing their business off as affiliated 
with that of the plaintiffs. The defendants counter-
claimed passing off by the plaintiffs. 
The intricacy of the factual background is matched by the 
detail and comprehensiveness of Vautier J. 's judgment, in 
which he not only granted the injunction sought, but also 
confirmed conclusively that in New Zealand it is the liberal 
approach to passing off and goodwill which has been adopted. 106 
-• 
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Before considering what he stated to be this very important 
aspect of the law as to passing off, Vautier J. noted 
that the first and second plaintiffs shared the goodwill 
and reputation in the name "Budget Rent A Car" which had 
been separately and independently established in Australia 
and in the United States and other parts of the wcrld. 107 
He then noted the divergence of judicial thinking on the 
108 subject of goodwill and quoted the following passage 
from the judgment of Lord Diplock in the Advocaat case: 
... the increasing recognition by Parliament 
of the need for more rigorous standards of 
commercial honesty is a factor which should 
not be overlooked by a judge confronted with 
the choice whether or not to extend by analogy 
to circumstances in which it has not previously 
been applied a principle which has been applied in 
previous cases where the circumstances although 
different had some features in common with those 
of the case which he has to decide. 
109 
It is submitted that this passage was cited to support the 
adoption of the liberal view, which reflects better the 
"standards of commercial honesty" than the stricter 
traditional view. It is especially relevant in New 
Zealand in view of the proposed adoption of trade practices 
1 . l t. 110 egis a ion. 
In reviewing the authorities, including the recent 
Australian and New Zealand decisions, Vautier J. found 
many precedents applying positively the principle of goodwill 
and reputation to situations such as the case at hand . 
.. 
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He concluded that Budget Australia and, later, that company 
and Budget US had, from the year 1968 onwards, a sufficiently 
established reputation and goodwill to entitle them to ask 
the Court to protect it. 111 Not only had Budget Australia 
had, from its very earliest days, New Zealanders as 
customers, but also, there had always been a great deal of 
trans-·Tasman migration over the years such that a large 
section of the New Zealand public was acquainted with Budget 
Australia and its activities. 
Vautier J. accepted market research evidence demonstrating 
of 
that 36 per centAtravel agency executives believed tha 
business of rental car hiring in New Zealand under the Budget 
name to be connected with overseas interests, although it is 
not clear whether this meant the Australian or the American 
Budget system. With respect, it is questionable whether such 
evidence is actually relevant to the issue in question given 
that the deception must be established in the minds of 
customers. 
The writer agrees with the conclusion that Budget Australia 
had established sufficient goodwill and reputation in 
New Zealand. However, it is not entirely clear from the 
judgment whether the main reason for His Honour's conclusion 
was Budget Australia's reputation amongst New Zealanders and 
Australians in New Zealand, or whether it was the fact that 
it had a presence and goodwill in New Zealand via franchisees 
and agents. If the latter was the major reason, is it 
perhaps not more correct to say that the goodwill belonged 
to the business of the local franchisees and agents? In 
-.. 
39. 
that event, the issue of a foreign trader's goodwill in 
New Zealand need not have arisen. Possibly the distinction 
is artificial, since the Budget business of the latter was 
really an extension of the business of Budget Australia. 
Although Vautier J.initially appeared to accept the traditio nal 
distinction between the reputation and goodwill of a business, 1
12 
he later cited
113 
from the jugment in Fletcher Challenge 
where Powell J. stated the real question to be whether the 
plaintiff had established the necessary reputation, rather 
than whether the plaintiff actually carried on business in 
114 the country. 
This indicates that as a corollary of accepting the liberal 
approach, the distinction between reputation and goodwill 
is diminished, in the sense that where a substantial reputation 
is proved to exist, the courts will accept minimal evidence 
of goodwill in the form of actual business activity . But 
some proof of local business activity is still necessary. 
The necessary damage to the goodwill of the plaintiff's 
business consists partly in the tarnishing of its reputation 
as a result of the defendant's activities and partly in 
damage to the actual goodwill of the business. 
Support for this particular development derives from the 
fact that Budget US was also found to have a protectable 
goodwill in New Zealand from 1968 onwards. It is more 
difficult in the case of Budget US to see from whence, 
other than its international reputation, this goodwill 
emanated. The franchise agreement between Budget US 
-40. 
and Budget Australia, applied in New Zealand in 1977 through 
Dominion Rental Cars Ltd., was not concluded until 1975. 
This is one step removed from the franchising or agency system 
which Budget Australia had operated in New Zealand since 1968. 
Since the defendants' adoption of the Budget name and logo 
commenced in 1971, should they not, as regards Budget us, 
have been entitled to continue such use by the defence of 
. ?115 prior user. The only answer must be that that the 
continuation of Mutual Avis' Budget operation was precluded 
by the longstanding international reputation of Budget US and 
the goodwill that it derived from 1977 onwards as franchisor 
of the Budget System in New Zealand. 
The conclusion that Budget US had an international reputation 
and goodwill in the Budget name is all the more significant 
in that it is not supported, as in the case of Budget Australia, 
by any economic, political or historic affinity or any trade 
agreement between New Zealand and the United States. In 
light of this, some may question whether Vautier J. did not go 
too far in thus finding. But the better view is that the 
existence of such an affinity or economic arrangement between 
two countries does no more than reinforce the fact that in the 
modern world, commercial activity and influence cannot be 
restricted in legal terms to one country alone. 
In any event, the finding that the business of Budget 
Australia enjoyed New Zealand reputation and goodwill would 
have been sufficient to enjoin the defendants' activities. 
The entire decision in this case, it is submitted, illustrates 
• • 
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the logic and necessity of adopting the liberal approach 
to goodwill, particularly where the plaintiff's business 
enjoys an international reputation and goodwill. Were the 
traditional approach adopted, the internationally reputed 
trader with connections in a foreign country would be unable 
to prevent a rival business from being set up in that country 
with the aim of cashing in on its reputation and filching its 
goodwill. This is all the more so where, as in this case, 
the defendant's ultimate aim is to prevent the internationally 
established trader from entering the local market. The Court's 
refusal to sanction such devious activities is certainly to 
be commended. 
D. The New Zealand Cases and their Promise 
for the Future 
Two main points emerge from these four cases as a whole. 
The first is that a business whose nature is such as to enable 
it to enjoy an international reputation may be found, on 
slender evidence of actual business activity in the court's 
jurisdiction, to have a goodwill there. The second is that 
territorial considerations are essentially questions of fact 
depending on the circumstances of the case rather than strict 
geographic and legal delimitations. 
The writer is in entire agreement with these. As to the 
first, it may be added that the existence of an international 
goodwill may be inferred from the fact that the defendant 
could, as was implied to be the case in Esanda and Crusader Oil, 
-42. 
and as was expressly stated to be so in Budget Rent A Car, 
have no reason to adopt and seek to retain the plaintiff's 
business name in the absence of a desire to appropriate 
t . f that goodw1·11. 116 some por ion o There is no point in 
cashing in on a reputation which does not bring in customers. 
Moreover, with the strong possibility in modern trade that a 
business will want to expand internationally, should a 
passing off action not be available to those traders whose 
reputation has preceded them in the proposed new place of 
business and who find, upon or prior to establishing themselves 
there, that the fruits of their labour have been spoiled or 
already harvested by a local trader? 
The adoption of the liberal approach has not opened and 
will not open the way for a spate of passing off actions by 
foreign traders. It will still be necessary to establish 
some business goodwill and activity in the territory where the 
tort has allegedly been coITLmitted. It is to be ~emembered 
that in the absence of strong trading activity in the 
jurisdiction, this approach only enables goodwill to be found 
where the business is of an international character. Further, 
the requirement of damage to goodwill will limit the number 
of successful actions. 
The judgment of Tompkins J. in Keg Restarants Ltd. and Ors. 
117 v. Brandy's Restaurant Tavern Ltd. and Ors., delivered 
between the decisions in Fletcher Challenge and Esanda and 
those in Crusader Oil aad Budget Rent A Car, confirms this. 
The case was not considered in terms of reputation slopover, 
• 
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but His Honour stated obiter that the extensive reputation 
of the first plaintiff, a Canadian company operating a chain 
of restaurants throughout Canada and parts of the United States, 
was not sufficient to prove goodwill in the name "Brandy's" in 
New Zealand. He appears to have held that goodwill subsisted 
only in the businesses of the second and third plaintiffs, 
the New Zealand licencees of the first. It is interesting 
to compare this with the finding in Budget Rent A Car that 
goodwill in the "Budget" name in New Zealand was vested in both 
the franchisors and the franchisee, Budget NZ. The judgment 
of Tompkins J. does not however, always d istinguish clearly 
between the three plaintiffs and the goodwill of each. 
At the end of the day, the approach of the New Zealand courts 
to the foreign trader alleging passing off in New Zealand boils 
down to the oft-quoted observation of Petersen J., admittedly 
in a copyright context although applicable as the rationale 
behind all intellectual property law, that "what is worth 
• • • f • h • II 118 copying is prima acie wort protecting . 
Moreover, as concluded Jeffries J. in the Crusader Oil 
in today's commercial world the name 
can be one of the most valuable assets a 
company has. Today's commercial answer 
to the famous question 'what's in a name?' 
is - a great deal. 
119 case, 
Fortunately, the New Zealand courts are prepared to recognise 
this in the context of international trading activity by 
pursuing the liberal approach adopted in other Common Law 
jurisdictions. To summarise, the position in New Zealand as 
regards passing off here by a local trader of a foreign trader's 
-• 
goods or services is clear. A business enjoying an 
international reputation in its goods or services which has 
extended to New Zealand will (assuming proof of the other 
elements of the action) be entitled to protect its business 
goodwill provided that it has some, albeit slight, actual 
trading activity here. If it has no actual business presence 
in New Zealand, although a misrepresentation may be established, 
the requirement of damage to goodwill will not be satisfied and 
the action will fail. Of course a foreign trader with no 
international reputation will be able to succeed in a passing 
off action if it actually engages in trade in New Zealand. 
In this situation, the fact that the trader is a foreigner 
makes no difference to satisfaction of the goodwill requirement 
as "the attractive force which brings in custom" will obviously 
be present in New Zealand. 
Whether the New Zealand approach is not indicative of a nascent 
movement towards a new tort of unfair competition i s a question 
which will be addressed in the following Part of this paper. 
III PASSING OFF AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
A vexed and interesting question which has attracted the 
attention of the highest judicial authorities in several 
jurisictions is whether the Common Law is developing a new 
tort of unfair competition. The question has arisen in the 
course of judicial consideration of various economic torts 
and intellectual property rights. However, it is specifically 
45. 
in cases of passing off, the tort of "unfair competition 
120 par excellence", that the possibility of such a new tort 
has been most thoroughly considered. It is important as a 
possible modern substitute for passing off, but also as an 
additional or alternative cause of action available to those 
traders unable to meet the requirements of a passing off action 
but whose predicament as a result of the defendant's allegedly 
unfair commercial activities clearly calls for justice to be 
done. 
The extent to which a tort of unfair competition may be 
permitted to burgeon by the New Zealand courts has ~ot yet 
been properly considered and is accordingly an open question• 
However, in recent passing off litigation the opportunities 
have been many. Despite this absence of direct consideration, 
it is submitted that a couple of emerging trends in the law 
of passing off in New Zealand and the attitude of the courts 
to what are blatant acts of impropriety on the part of the 
defendants indicate an increasing judicial intolerance of 
unfair competition. 
This is all the more significant when placed in the context 
of the current preparation in New Zealand of trade practices 
legislation modelled on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.). 
Although this proposed legislation and its likely effect on 
the tort of passing off are the subject of Part IV of this 
paper, the strong likelihood of the inclusion in it of a 
provision equivalent to section 52(1) of the Australian Act 
should be noted at this stage. Section 52(1) makes it 
unlawful for a corporation, in tr~de or commerce, to engage 
in conduct which is misleading or deceptive or which is 
likely to mislead or deceive. This provision has been 
regularly relied upon by aggrieved traders in Australian 
courts as an alternative or additional cause of action to 
passing off. 
The point to be made here is perhaps best expressed in the 
now famous words of Lord Diplock in the Advocaat case, in 
which, after noting "the increasing recognition by Parliament 
of the need for more rigorous standards of commercial honesty", 
His Honour went on to say: 121 
Where over a period of years there can be 
discerned a steady trend in legislation 
which reflects the view of successive 
Parliaments as to what the public interest 
demands in a particular field of law, 
development of the common law in that part 
of the same field which has been left to it 
ought to proceed upon a parallel rather than 
a diverging course. 
Before turning to the New Zealand approach, it is necessary 
first to examine the rationale, nature and extent of a tort 
of unfair competition and secondly, to ascertain its status 
in other jurisdictions. 
A. The Tort of Unfair Competition 
The tort is as yet uncertain in its ambit. Although 
definitions of unfair competition are usually very wide,
122 
perhaps the most useful is that contained in the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, 
as revised in 1967. 
provides that 
Article 10 bis of the Convention 
(1) The countries of the Union are bound 
47. 
to assure to nationals of such countries 
effective protection against unfair competition. 
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest 
practices in industrial or commercial matters 
constitutes an act of unfair competition. 
(3) The following in particular shall be 
prohibited: 
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion 
by any means whatever with the establishment, 
the goods, or the industrial or commercial 
activities, of a competitor; 
2. false allegations in the course of trade of 
such a nature as to discredit the establishment, 
the goods, or the industrial or commercial 
activities, of a competitor; 
3. indications or allegations the use of which in 
the course of trade is liable to mislead the 
public as to the nature, the manufacturing 
process, the characteristics, the suitability 
for their purposes, or the quantity, of the goods. 
Although wider in ambit than the tort of passing off, this 
definition clearly encompasses the tort. 
One commentator has suggested that there are three essential 
elements to a prima facie case of unfair competition: 124 
1. The defendant's act must either be unlawfui (however 
that is interpreted) or a knowing misrepresentation or deception 
of the public. 
2. The plaintiff is an individual or member of a clearly 
defined class of which the defendant knows (or which he can 
reasonably foresee). 
locus standi. 
Thus the plaintiff must have sufficient 
3. The act must cause or probably cause significant 
125 damage to his "property". 
It will be for the defendant to rebut a prima facie case of 
unfair competition by seeking to justify it. Again, this 
appears to be an expansive form of the tort of passing off. 
.. 
48 
There are three reasons most frequently given to support the 
d f t t f f . t . t. 126 t 11 nee or a or o un air compe 1 ion: o a ow courts 
to promote honest and fair dealing; to protect the 
purchasing public; and to protect not the rights of the public 
but the rights and property of other traders. 
reason is said to carry the greatest support. 
The last 
It is also the 
policy behind the tort of passing off. Why then is the passing 
off action insufficient or inappropriate to ensure justice in 
all situations of unfair competition? The answer must be that 
its requirements, as traditionally formulated, are too onerous 
and technical. Further, the action does not require proof 
of fraud or improper motive; it is equally available to a 
trader whose business goodwill is damaged by the innocent 
misrepresentations of another . 
The question which ultimately arises is whether the solution 
indeed lies in the creation of a new tort of unfair competition 
or whether greater flexibility in the tort of passing off will 
suffice to ensure justice. A strong argument against the 
creation of the tort is that to base it upon improper or 
dishonest intention allows wide scope for prejudice. As one 
writer has commented, "average judges would get muddled over 
subtle distinctions and think them unjust whenever they can't 
127 
understand". There are other valid arguments against 
the tort and these appear in the following rejections of it 
in overseas jurisdictions. 
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B. The Approach in Other Jurisdictions 
1. United States of America 
In the United States, a Common Law doctrine of unfair 
competition has only been recognised in the 1918 case of 
International News Service v. The Associated Press, 128 in 
which one news agency was prevented from copying and selling 
as its own news gathered by another, a case of "inverse'' 
passing off. 
Pitney J., delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, 
129 
described the theft of the news as follows: 
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts 
to an unauthorised interference with the 
normal operation of complainant's legitimate 
business precisely at the point where the profit 
is to be reaped, in order to divert a material 
portion of the profit from those who have earned 
it to those who have not, with special advantage 
to the defendant in the competition because 
of the fact that it is not burdened with any 
part of the expense of gathering the news. The 
transaction speaks for itself, and a court of 
equity ought not to hesitate long in character-
izing it as an unfair competition in business. 
The underlying principle is much the same as that 
which lies at the base of the equitable theory 
of consideration in the law of trusts - that 
he who has fairly paid the price should have the 
beneficial use of the property. 
The case is not, however, a particularly good precedent. 
There was a strong dissent by Brandeis J. on the grounds 
that monopoly protection is against the public interest; 
progress needs competition and competition involves a degree 
of imitation; a plaintiff can often protect himself by 
contract or under the body of intellectual property 
legislation; and the legislature is better equipped than the 
so. 
courts to decide what is unfair competition and how those 
interests which require protection should be accorded it. 
The concurrence with the majority opinion by Holmes J., on 
the passing off ground, was lukewarm. 
Furthermore, the case has subsequently attracted judicial 
· · · b h · h . d 130 d 131 criticism ot in t e Unite States an overseas. 
2. England 
Considerable encouragement to those arguing for a tort of 
unfair competition was given in the Advocaat case in 1979. 
The plaintiffs had for many years manufactured in the 
Netherlands an egg and spirit-based liquor called ttAdvocaat'', 
exported to and distributed in Britain where it acquired a 
substantial reputation as a distinct and recognisable beverage. 
The defendants sought to take advantage of this reputation by 
marketing a drink described as ttKeeling's Old English Advocaattt, 
composed of dried egg powder mixed with Cyprus sherry. 
Although it could not be shown that this drink was being 
mistaken for Warnink's Advocaat, it captured a substantial 
part of the plaintiff's English market (especially the lower 
end of it) thereby causing damage to the plaintiff's business 
goodwill. 
Although the decision of the House of Lords did not establish 
a tort of unfair competition, it at least confirmed the 
flexibility of the tort of passing off to meet new situations. 
51. 
According to Lord Diplock, the question of extending the 
tort in this case was essentially one of legal policy. 
mh f t 132 ... e ac s 
disclose[d] a case of unfair, not to say 
dishonest, trading of a kind for which 
a rational system of law ought to provide 
a remedy to other traders whose business 
or goodwill is injured by it. 
Further, "the forms that unfair trading takes will alter with 
the ways in which trade is carried on and business reputation 
d d · 11 . d" 133 an goo w1 acquire . 
Lord Fraser took a similar approach, stating that " ... business 
morality seems to require that they should be entitled to 
protect their goodwill. The name of the tort committed by 
the party making the misrepresentation is not important 11 • 134 
Following the Advocaat decision, much was to be expected from 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council one year later 
in the case of Cadbury Schweppes Pty. Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co. 
Pty. Ltd., 135 on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South 
136 Wales. The case concerned alleged appopriation by the 
defendant of the plaintiffs' advertising campaign for and 
get-up of a lemon squash drink. 
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs relied not only on passing 
off but also on a tort of unfair competition. They argued 
that the defendant had fraudulently and . deliberately set out 
to pirate the advertising themes for the product as well as 
its get-up. Powell J. concluded that the defendant's 
conduct was a deliberate and calculated misappropriation. 
His Honour however found that there had been no relevant 
misrepresentation and that the plaintiffs had not therefore 
made out a case for relief based upon the expanded concept 
of passing off or upon "unfair trading". The Court was not 
prepared to regard mere misappropriation as a basis for 
either cause of action. 
In the Privy Council, their Lordships upheld the decision 
of Powell J. but sidestepped the issue of unfair competition 
irrespective of deception or confusion. They claimed that 
it was not necessary to consider this as the plaintiffs had 
restricted their argument to cases based on such confusion and 
not to misrepresentation alone. With respect, this is sur-
prising since the issue was clearly raised in the Supreme 
137 
Court. 
So it is not absolutely clear from the decision what the 
status of the tort of unfair competition is in England. 
Its existence may be denied by the very fact that it was not 
considered. In any event, had their Lordships not considered 
that the plaintiffs were no longer interested in this ground 
of relief, the indications are that they would not have 
succeeded. 
declarations. 
Indeed, the case contains ringing policy 
Lord Scarman emphasised the sanctity of competition:
138 
But competition must remain free; and 
competition is safeguarded by the necessity 
for the plaintiff to prove that he has built 
up an "intangible property right" in the 
advertised descriptions of his product, or, 
in other words, that he has succeeded by 
such method in giving his product a dis-
tinctive character accepted by the market. 
A defendant, however, does no wrong by. 
53. 
entering a market created by another and 
thereby competing with its creator. 
The line may be difficult to draw but, 
unless it is drawn, competition may be stifled. 
His Honour similarly emphasised the necessity to maintain a 
balance between the protection of a plaintiff's investment in 
his product and the protection of free competition. The law 
will only permit competition to be restricted where the 
misappropriation constitutes a misrepresentation, because 
such a misappropriation is an invasion of the plaintiff 1 s 
"intangible property right". 
monopolistic. 
Any other approach would be 
Much disappointment has been expressed at the failure of the 
Privy Council to positively address the issue of a tort of 
f 
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un air competition. It is submitted that pending further 
judicial pronouncement settling the status of the tort, it 
should at present be regarded as non-existent in England. 
Instead, relief will continue to be granted through a more 
flexible approach to passing off. 
3. Australia 
It has already been seen that in Australia, the doctrine of 
unfair competition developed by the U.S. Supreme Court was 
criticised in the 1939 case of Victoria Park Recreation and 
140 
Racing Grounds Co. Ltd. v. Taylor. 
In the 1984 case of Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris,
141 
the existence in Australia of a "general action for unfair 
competition or unfair trading" was unanimously rejected by 
the Full High Court of Australia. 
The following conclusion of Deane J. was reached with the 
concurrence of all the other members of the Court: 
The rejection of a general action for 'unfair 
competition' involves no more than a recognition 
of the fact that the existence of such an action 
is inconsistent with the established limits of 
the traditional and statutory causes of action 
which are available to a trader in respect of 
damage caused or threatened by a competitor. 
Those limits, which define the boundary between 
the area of legal or equitable restraint and 
protection and the area of untrammelled competition, 
increasingly reflect what the responsible Parliament 
or Parliaments have determined to be the appropriate 
balance between the competing claims and policies. 
Neither legal principle nor social utility 
requires or warrants the obliteration of that 
boundary by the importat.i:on of a cause of action 
whose main characteristic is the scope it allows, 
under high-sounding generalizations, for judicial 
indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of what is 
fair in the market place. 
This rejection was, however, prefaced by the statement that 
it did not involve a denial of the desirability of adopting 
a flexible approach to the traditional forms of action, and 
specifically passing off, where such an approach is necessary 
to adapt them to meet new situations and circumstances. The 
Advocaat case was cited as an illustration of this. 
c. A New Tort of Unfair Competition in New Zealand? 
The status of a tort of unfair competition in New Zealand is 
not entirely clear. Whilst on the facts of many of the 
55. 
recent passing off cases the issue could have been raised, 
h t t h b d . l 142 t e tor appears o .ave een argue in on y one case, 
and even then it is difficult to extricate from the judgment 
what was actually decided on that ground. 
This is so despite the attention focussed on the tort in 
other juridictions. Almost all of the New Zealand cases were 
decided after the Privy Council delivered judgment in the 
Pub Squash case, although none in which the issue could have 
arisen have been decided since the November 1984 Moorgate 
decision in Australia. 
However, this is not to say that indications are not given of 
how New Zealand courts might approach the question should it 
ever call for positive deliberation. The tenor of the New 
Zealand approach was set in the earliest of this series of 
cases by Somers J. in The New Zealand Farmers' Cooperative 
. . f C t b Ltd F d' C d 143 Association o an er ury . v. armers Tra ing o. Lt .. 
Citing from the judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in 
the English case of Parker-Knoll Ltd. v. Knoll International Ltd.~ 4' 
His Honour said that the background to the rule against passing 
off is "the straightforward principle that trading must not 
even unintentionally be unfair 11 • 145 To this one should add 
the words "let alone deliberately unfair". 
The only case which appears to have followed the Pub Squash 
approach is Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd. v. Mutual 
Rental Cars (Auckland) Ltd. and Dominion Rent A Car. Ltd .. 
146 
In refusing to grant injunctive relief against the passing off 
by Dominion of its rental vehicle service as and for the 
56. 
business of Mutual, Moller J. cited the well-known passages 
from the judgment of Lord Scarman and considered "the 
broad argument of public policy to the effect that competition 
must, as far as is properly justifiable, be safeguarded 11 • 147 
The decision was subsequently criticised by Vautier J. in 
148 
the latest case of this on-going saga, on the grounds that 
Moller J. had not been presented with all the issues and evidence, 
in particular the evidence as to the defendants' improper 
intention. 
149 Four months later in Regan v. Grant, Eichelbaum J. enjoined 
a former employee of the plaintiff from passing off his 
pizza products as those of the plaintiff. The grant of inter-
locutory relief was prefaced by the following statement: 15
0 
The plaintiffs, however, are entitled to 
protection only from unfair competition. 
They cannot prevent the defendants or 
anyone else from competing so long as such 
competition does not infringe or threaten 
the plaintiffs' rights. (E h · dd d) mp .asis a e . 
This statement would be consistent with that of Lord Scarman 
in Pub Squash that competition will only be restricted where 
the misappropriation constitutes a misrepresentation invading 
the plaintiff's "intangible property right", were it not for 
the fact that Eichelbaum J. did not explicitly find there to 
have been a misrepresentation. The plaintiff's pleading 
on the passing off cause of action appears to have alleged 
"conduct" which deceived or was calculated to deceive the public. 
And in cdnsidering the balance of convenience and the difficulty 
of assessing damages to the plaintiff, His Honour said it would 
57. 
be unnecessary to determine the extent to which the downturn 
in the plaintiff's business was attributable to unfair 
competition on the one hand or to other general factors on 
151 the other. 
Thus although a tort of unfair competition as such was not 
argued, the treatment of passing off in the c~se was in terms 
of a general doctrine of unfair competition. 
It could possibly be argued that the judges in Regan v. 
Grant and the Farmers Trading Co. case were only using the 
terms "unfair competition" and "unfair trading" as synonymous 
for behaviour which amounts to passing off. But it is 
submitted that the use of the terms goes further than this. 
Not all passing off is deliberate or unfair and not all unfair 
competition amounts to passing off, although it did in these cases. 
The use of the terms indicates the rationale and aims of the 
tort of passing off. In any event, the fact that passing 
off was seen as a remedy for unfair competition is significant 
in itself. 
The most thorough, though by no means conclusive, consideration 
of the tort in New Zealand is that of Vautier J. in Lion 
. d . . B . L d 152 Breweries Lt. v. Dominion reweries t. His Honour 
cited from the judgment of Lord Diplock in the Advocaat case 
in which the present-day description of the action as being 
one for "passing off" was said by His Lordship to be perhaps 
misleading. He then reproduced the warning sounded by 
Lord Scarman in Pub Squash regarding the dangers of extending 
58. 
f h t t f . ff . d 153 too art e or o passing o as now recognise. 
The passage cited, said Vautier J., was relied upon by the 
defendant to show that English law has not come to recognise 
as a tort "unfair competition". The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff was trying to base a case on the existence 
of such a cause of action. His Honour then commented: 154 
Labels such as this for causes of action, as 
the law relating to the tort now broadly 
referred to as unlawful interference with 
economic relations has shown, can be mis-
leading. What must be considered is the 
actual scope of the tort as now recognised. 
It would appear from what Lord Diplock said 
in his judgment ... in the [AdvocaatJcase 
that he would quite probably regard 'action 
for unfair trading' as a more appropriate 
general description today than 'action for 
passing off' . 
Despite his dislike of labels, Vautier J. must be taken 
in this passage to have implied, not necessarily that there 
exists a separate tort of unfair competition, but at least 
that passing off in its modern and extended form is designed 
as an avenue for relief against unfair trading. That this 
is "the actual scope of the tort" is supported by His Honour's 
155 acceptance that 
the evidence so far adduced makes it clear 
that the defendant deliberately and intentionally 
chose to adopt the word 'red' as part of the 
name to be used. It is, I accept, for the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant deliberately 
set out to secure by these means part of the 
plaintiff's trade. The plaintiff is entitled, 
on the present state of the law, I agree, to 
succeed if it can establish that what the 
defendant has deliberately decided to do is 
in fact likely to have that result. 
His Honour then cited the statement of Lord Morris in 
Parker-Knoll Ltd. v. Knoll International Ltd. referred to 
59. 
above, saying that it seemed to have subsequently met 
with general approval. 
The emphasis on the deliberateness and impropriety of the 
defendant's intention is of course at the heart of any 
doctrine of unfair competition. As will be seen shortly, 
it is an aspect which has been picked up by most of the 
New Zealand cases and as such, even though no separate tort 
of unfair competition can probably be said to exist yet in 
New Zealand, is of considerable significance in showing how 
the tort of passing off is being manipulated to provide 
relief in cases of unfairness. 
A further point to be noted in the first passage cited from 
Vautier J.'s judgment is the reference to "the tort now 
broadly referred to as unlawful interference with economic 
relations". In the absence of any authorities cited to 
support the existence of this tort, it is assumed that 
His Honour was there referring to his own first instance 
decision156 in Van Camp Chocolates Ltd. v. Aulsebrooks Ltd., 157
 
in which the existence of a tort of unlawful interference with 
economic interests was in dispute. His Honour there held 
that such an economic tort did not exist as distinct from 
a limited number of recognised torts. 
On appeal in 1984, it was held that there is a Common Law 
tort in New Zealand of interfering with the trade or business 
of another person. The essence of the tort is deliberate 
interference with the plaintiff's business by unlawful means 
with intent to harm the plaintiff's economic interests. 
60. 
There is no liability under this head if the reasons which 
actuate the defendant to use unlawful means are wholly 
independent of a wish to interfere with the plaintiff's 
business, such interference being no more than an incidental 
consequence foreseen by and gratifying to the defendant. 158 
This is clearly a distinct tort from those of passing off 
and unfair competition. Its significance in the context 
of the present discussion is that the extensions apparently 
being effected by the New Zealand courts to the tort of passing 
off, in particular the importance attached to improper 
intention on the part of a defendant, do place passing off 
more in line with this and other economic torts. Conspiracy 
to injure a person in his trade, successfully argued as an 
additional ground of liability in two of the New Zealand cases, 159 
is one such example of an economic tort requiring proof of intent. 
Finally, in Budget Rent A Car Systems Pty. Ltd. v. Mutual 
Rental Cars Ltd., although a tort of unfair competition was 
not apparently argued as a head of relief, it is respectfully 
submitted that Vautier J., having gone a certain distance in 
considering the tort in the Lion Breweries case, missed a 
prime opportunity to settle the question of the status of 
the tort in New Zealand. On any interpretation of the nature 
and extent of the tort of unfair competition, the facts 
of the case160 clearly disclosed grounds for relief under 
this head, if i ~ exists at all. 
However, the tenor of the entire judgment is very much in 
favour of restraining acts of unfair competition in the 
market place. And whilst only a passing reference was 
made to the Pub Squash case, 161 the judgment of Lord Diplock 
162 in Advocaat was quoted at length with obvious approval. 
The discussion thus far establishes that, from the few 
New Zealand cases which have considered the policy reasons 
for and against passing off as "a particular species of 
' 1 d d ' th ' ' d II 16 3 f f , ' ' wrong inc u e wi in a wi er genus o un air competition 
or which have discussed in broad terms a tort of unfair 
competition, it is not possible to infer recognition of such 
a separate C.ommon Law tort in New Zealand. The cases simply 
do not go that far. However, they do evidence considerable 
support for judicial restraint on improper or dishonest 
commercial activity via the tort of passing off. 
To this end, certain aspects of the cause of action appear 
to be undergoing modification in New Zealand, and it is fair 
to say that in several cases relief would probably not have 
been granted were it not for what has been aptly described 
164 as "the sleeze element". 
1. Intention of the defendant 
Despite the Common Law origins of the action for passing off, 
it is now well settled that it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff to prove a fraudulent or dishonest intention to 
deceive. The law as to this is conveniently summarised in 
Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts: 165 
At common law it was necessary to prove 
an actual fraudulent intention, but a 
different view was taken in equity, and 
now it is generally accepted that it is not 
necessary in an action for passing off to prove 
an intent to deceive. Indeed, talk about 
deceit tends to obscure the essential fact 
that the plaintiff himself has not been 
deceived: his complaint is that the 
defendant has deceived other persons and 
that that deception is injuring the 
plaintiff's trade. It is sufficient in 
all cases to prove that the practice 
complained of is calculated (that is to 
say, likely) to deceive. 
This flows of course from the fact that the basis of the cause 
of action is the damage or likelihood of damage to the 
plaintiff's proprietary interest in the goodwill of his or 
her business. 
On the other hand, it has also been established that in proving 
that a representation is calculated to deceive, it is helpful, 
though not conclusive, to prove an actual intent to deceive, 
for the court assumes that a trader who intends to deceive 
166 
succeeds. Such an intention may be more readily inferred 
where the defendant persists in his or her conduct with 
knowledge of the distinctive name of the plaintiff, whether 
attached to the plaintiff's goods or business.
167 
Of the twenty nine recent passing off cases in New Zealand, 
fifteen discussed the defendant's intention. In only two 
of these cases was relief declined.
168 Of the fourteen 
cases in which the defendant's intention was not adverted to, 
the evidence detailed in the judgments of nine of these, all 
interlocutory applications, could be regarded as suggesting 
an intent to deceive.
169 In each of these nine cases relief 
was granted. 
The prima facie conclusion to be drawn from these figures 
is that the New Zealand courts are materially affected in 
their decisions by the presence of an unfair intention. 
Whether this conclusion can be disproved and whether the 
emphasis on intent is undue in terms of the established 
elements of a passing off action can be stated following 
analysis of the cases considering intention, divided into 
three categories. 
In the first category are those cases in which the defendant's 
intention was considered despite its being expressly said 
to be irrelevant. The second category encompasses those 
cases in which intention was considered and, it is submitted, 
thought to be relevant on the grounds that this would enable 
the court to infer success in deceiving. In the third 
category are those cases in which intention was merely considered 
without reasons therefor being provided or was considered and 
expressly said to be relevant. 
(a) The first category 
There is only one case in the first category. In 
Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd. and Mutual Rental 
170 
Cars (Auckland) Ltd. v. Dominion Rent A Car Ltd., Moller J. 
considered whether Dominion had made a misrepresentation in the 
171 
in the course of trade and stated: 
In connexion with this I emphasize that it 
is not necessary for Mutual to prove a 
fraudulent intention to deceive. 
After citing the passage from Salmond and Heuston, 
His Honour then expressed his view that there was no doubt, 
on the evidence, that when adopting its extended operations 
using the "Budget" and "Rent A Car" names and thereafter 
carrying those operations on, Dominion did so with its eyes 
. H 'd 172 open. His onour sai : 
And consequently this case goes further than 
the adoption of a practice likely to deceive 
and has ·clear elements of actions done with 
an intent to deceive. 
The evidence establishing such an intent was then detailed. 
The question is: why did Moller J. go to such lengths if 
it was unnecessary to prove a fraudulent intent? It is 
submitted that His Honour was not merely following the view 
that an intention to deceive implies likely deceit and damage 
as he expressly found on the evidence that there was a strong 
173 
likelihood of damage. The reason must be that clearly, 
the defendant could not be allowed to continue such improper 
conduct. 
(b) The second category 
In the second category there are four cases. In New Zealand 
Farmers' Cooperative Association of Canterbury Ltd. v. 
Farmers '.i'rading Co. Ltd. , 
17 4 the plaintiff company had, 
since 1881, traded throughout the South Island as a retailer, 
general merchant, stock and station agent and motor vehicle 
dealer. At least between 1930 and 1939 it was popularly 
known as "The Farmers" and since July 1971 had been known as 
"Farmers". The defendant had used the name "Farmers Trading 
Company" since 1926 and operated a number of stores in the 
North Island. In 1978 FTC acquired from the second defendant 
a department store in the South Island and began advertising 
and trading under the name "Farmers"· FTC had been advised 
by its solicitors that this course of conduct could render 
it liable in a passing off action to NZFCA. 
Following fruitless correspondence between the parties' 
solicitors, proceedings were instituted by NZFCA. 
In granting relief against this passing off, Somers J. expressly 
relied, inter alia, on the authorities establishing that 
actual deception and damage could be inferred from proof 
of the defendant's intentional and knowing deception. 175 The 
evidence was said to be sufficient to take the case out of the 
protection of the exception accorded to the honest use of a 
trader's own name in business. His Honour concluded that FTC 
had traded unfairly and had continued its course after 
becoming aware that its practices were likely to deceive or 
confuse. 176 
In Regan 177 . h lb f . h v. Grant, E1c e aum J., a ter surveying t e 
evidence of passing off, turned to the intention of the 
defendants, said to be a relevant consideration on the 
authority of an earlier New Zealand case, Klisers Farmhouse 
178 Bakeries Ltd. v. Allied Foods Co. Ltd .. His Honour found 
that on the information before the Court, it could hardly 
be doubted that the defendants set out to take advantage of 
the goodwill and reputation that the plaintiff had established, 
and ' d 179 sai : 
I am mindful that a finding of intent to 
deceive is not the same as stating that the 
intent has been successful but the step 
between the two is a short one: Claudius 
Ash Sons & Co. v.Invicta Manufacturing Co. 
The defendants' intention also clearly influenced Eichelbaum J. 
to find that the difficulty of assessing whether damages to 
the plaintiffs would be due to this unfair competition or 
to other general factors meant that damages would not afford 
an adequate remedy to the plaintiffs should they succeeed in 
the substantive action. Accordingly, the balance of 
convenience lay in favour of granting an interim injunction. 
A third put borderline case in this category is Shotover Gorge 
Jetboats Ltd. v. Marine Enterprises Ltd.
180 Since 1970 the 
plaintiff had operated on a particular stretch of the Shotover 
River a tourist jet boat service. This was a widely promoted 
tourist attraction in the Queenstown area. Evidence was 
accepted as to the distinctiveness of its boats and vans 
bearing the inscription "Shotover Jet" and as to the established 
goodwill of the business. In 1977 the defendant company, 
originally operating a similar service on Lake Wakatipu and 
the Kawarau River, extended its operations to the lower waters 
of the Shotover River, in direct competition with the plaintiff 
company. Its boats, vans and premises were labelled "Lower 
Shotover Jet" with "Lower" appearing much less prominently 
than the rest of the name. 
67. 
Although Hardie Boys J. did not refer to the defendant's 
intention at all, this was clearly a case of improper motive. 
His Honour did, however, cite the 1923 New Zealand case of 
National Timber Co. Ltd. v. National Hardware, Timber & 
Machinery Co. Ltd. 181as authority for the proposition that 
proof of deception is not necessary but obviously greatly 
strengthens the plaintiff's case. 182 And in the course of 
considering whether the words "Lower Shotover Jet" were merely 
descriptive, His Honour referred183 to the statement of 
Moller J. in New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. New Zealand 
Insurance Brokers Ltd~ 84 that if words are descriptive, one 
cannot assume that confusion will arise from the same use 
by another trader, provided there is some small difference in 
format and no fraud by the defendant. 
It is unfortunate for the purposes of this analysis that Hardie 
Boys J. did not overtly apply these propositions of law to 
the facts of the case, although the grant of an interlocutory 
injunction did not require it. 185 
The fourth case in this category, Lion Breweries Ltd. v. 
Dominion Breweries Ltd., is more explicit on the relevance of 
an improper intention. After stating that it was not necessary 
to prove an intention to deceive the public,
186 
Vautier J. 
went on to find that the defendant's intention was one factor 
indicating a substantial risk of confusion and loss of sales 
by the plaintiff, although he did not cite any authorities 
t . th t' Hi' s Honour ~tated-.
187 supper ing e connec ion. -
I cannot see here any very good reason for 
the defendant choosing the name roouble 
Red' if it has no desire and sees no risk 
Later 
68. 
of its product being associated with or 
mistaken for a product of the plaintiff .... 
The desire to put the defendant's product 
out as complimentary to its existing 
'Double Brown' seems to me an unconvincing 
reason. Why choose the colour red of all 
the other colours in the spectrum? ... if 
[ the desire to achieve a beer with quite 
a different taste was its ] objective one 
would have expected that the defendant would 
strive to pick on a name which had no 
association at all with the plaintiff's 
product. 
he concluded: 
188 
The implication that no name can be devised 
which would be as successful in promoting 
sales as the name 'Double Red' is surely a 
two-edged sword as regards the defendant in 
that it strongly suggests that only in this 
way is the plaintiff's beer likely to fulfil 
the sales expectations which carries with it 
the implication that the defendant will thereby 
secure the benefit of some of the reputation 
built up by the plaintiff for its own bitter 
beer. 
The significance of these four cases being separated from those 
in the third category (being the cases in which no reasons are 
given as to why intention should be relevant) is that the 
h d t d . . d . h .. 1 d h . 189 approac a op e is in accor ance wit princip e an aut ority . 
They cannot therefore be regarded as placing an undue emphasis 
on the presence of an unfair intention since its relevance 
in this respect has been established as valid. The cases do, 
however, contribute to showing that the presence of a dishonest 
intention has materially influenced the New Zealand courts in 
granting relief against passing off. As such they must be 
taken as indicating further that unfair competition will not 
be tolerated. 
This is confirmed by the third category of cases in which 
the defendant's dishonest intention was considered. 
(c) The third category 
The court in these eleven cases failed to state why the 
defendant's intention was relevant, some merely considering 
it along with the other evidence adduced, others expressly 
stating it to be relevant in the determination of the dispute. 
It is of course assumed here that a court does not refer in 
its judgment to wholly irrelevant material, an assumption 
which the reader may or may not consider to be valid. 
First of all there are four cases in which the defendant's 
dishonest intention was adverted to in the course of consider-
ation of all the information before the court. In Urban 
190 
Sports Apparel (NZ) Ltd. v. Urban Sports Apparel (Remuera) Ltd., 
the bona fides of the Director of the defendant company in the 
matter was doubted at the beginning of the judgment before 
the facts were even set out. This factor was not adverted to 
again by Gallen J., who granted the interlocutory relief sought. 
The defendant's intention seems to have weighed considerably 
on the judges deciding three of the reputation slopover cases, 
191 
Esanda, Crusader, and Budget Rent A Car. 
In the course of considering whether the plaintiff company 
had established a sufficient goodwill in New Zealand, Casey J. 
in the Esanda case observed that the extraordinary coincidence 
in the choice OL identical "fancy" non-descriptive names 
could give rise to grave doubts as to the good faith of the 
defendant company'_s Director and majority shareholder and as 
to his explanation of how he choses the name "Esanda". 
70. 
Although disputed questions of credibility were not for 
him to decide at this interim stage, this was another 
factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the 
plaintiffs had shown a serious question to be tried. The 
approach of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Fletcher 
Challenge was said to lend support to this contention of the 
1 . t'ff 192 pain i s. 
Indeed, the Court in Fletcher Challenge was so influenced by 
the obvious fraud of the defendants that it found goodwill to 
subsist in a mere reputation, an extreme departure from the 
traditional school of thought as to the nature of the goodwill 
of a foreign trader. 
That this consideration influenced C~sey J. is clear from the 
fact that His Honour granted interim relief on only slight 
evidence of a business connection with New Zealand. Had the 
defendant's intention not been improper, the decision, on the 
evidence, could well have gone the other way. 
In Crusader Oil, Jeffries J. considered how the defendant's 
personnel came to fix upon the name of "Crusader" and stated 
it to be "a most important part of this judgment 11 •
193 That 
name was found to have been decided upon with knowledge that 
this was the name of an existing Australian company of 
international repute. His Honour stated that the Court would 
be failing in its duty not to avert to one of the defendant's 
director's overall discomfort in the witness box when giving 
. d d. h h . - th 19 4 evi ence surroun ing t e c oice or e name. 
71. 
Further, in dealing with the contention that there could 
be no passing off as the parties were not engaged in the 
same field of activity, Jeffries J. acknowledged the 
difference between oil and gas exploration on the one hand 
and mineral on the other, but found that "the activities of 
the defendant itself extinguish [ed ] that difference to utter 
, 1 • th' II 195 1rre evance in is case. 
His Honour's final reflection before turning to the law was that 
[a] deliberately chosen policy in writing 
this judgrnent has been to make, as far as 
possible, unambiguous findings on the facts ... 
An important aspect of that fact finding exercise 
has been the credibility decisions to which the 
court was driven. Nothing clarifies the case 
law like the facts of the case before the court. 
Although a clear case of passing off had been made out, the 
approach taken in the interpretation of the law was obviously 
influenced by the unfairness and mala f ides of the defendant's 
acts. 
The Budget case is in much the same vein. Vautier J. was at 
196 
pains to elucidate the defendants' unequivocally unfair intention 
and conduct. 197 It must be partly for this reason that the 
liberal approach to the goodwill requirement was adopted. It 
should be noted, however, that a conspiracy cause of action 
was also argued and His Honour was therefore required to make 
a finding of malicious intent. 
In six cases198 the Court considered the defendant's intention 
in assessing the balance of convenience and in all but one the 
interim relief sought was granted. The defendants had either 
deliberately attempted to deceive the public and appropriate 
72. 
some portion of the plaintiff's goodwill or had embarked 
upon the course of conduct complained of "with their eyes 
open". 
It was in Meat Services Ltd. v. John Moses that the application 
for an interim injunction was refused. Although the defendant 
did not appear to have any dishonest intention, Eichelbaum J. 
took into account the fact that he commenced marketing his 
pet food with the particular get-up and label complained of 
knowing that there was a degree of risk involved. 
.d 199 Honour sai: 
But His 
I am not convinced that in borderline cases this 
is of decisive weight because it seems to me 
to have an element of circuity. If a trader 
believes that his proposed design is sufficiently 
far removed from one in existing use there must 
be a point where he is entitled to take his 
stand on that, notwithstanding that a degree of 
risk is involved. 
The statement is apt on the facts of the case, but a note of 
warning should be sounded against its being applied to 
situations of dishonest intention. The "point where he 
is entitled to take his stand on that"must surely be restricted 
to where, on the evidence, the conduct in question is innocent -
and this will be rare in a passing off case. Otherwise, 
who is to prevent a trader from alleging a belief that his or 
her get-up or name was novel? 
The firal case in this third category is Klissers Farmhouse 
Bakeries Ltd. v. Allied Foods Co. Ltd.JOO Vautier J. granted 
an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant company 
from advertising and marketing its new Milk and Honey Loaf in 
a bag incorporating the same features and gingham pattern as 
73. 
as the plaintiff's bread bags. His Honour described as 
too broad the statement in Kerly's Law of Trademarks that
201 
there can hardly be passing off by get-up 
alone unless the resemblance between the 
goods is ... so close that it can hardly 
occur unless by deliberate imitation; 
and even then that may not be enough. 
But in considering whether there was a substantial question to 
be tried, His Honour found that the evidence pointed strongly 
to the defendant having adopted the pattern, colour and format 
of the bag with the intention of bringing about confusion so 
that sales which would otherwise have gone to the plaintiff 
ld 
. 202 
wou accrue to it. Two English authorities were cited 
for the relevance of this consideration in cases of passing 
203 
off of get-up. His conclusion was further supported 
by an earlier instance where the defendant had put on the 
market rolls in a bag similar to that used by the plaintiff. 
In assessing the balance of convenience, Vautier J. also took 
into account, on the authority of Probe Publications Ltd. v. 
204 
Profile Communications Ltd. and Ors., that the defendant 
had gone into this with its eyes open. His Honour said:
205 
Clearly this is not ... a basis which should 
be used by itself as providing any substantial 
support for the granting of interlocutory 
relief. Nevertheless, in the present case 
there is more to it in my view ... in that 
this defendant ... was well aware that it was 
getting into the field of possible passing off. 
Clearly, therefore, the defendant's dishonest intention was an 
important factor in the conclusion that a strong case of 
passing off had been made out. 
Looking at all three categories of cases as a whole, the 
foregoing analysis of the courts' treatment of unfair 
intention confirms the prima facie conclusion that the majority 
of New Zealand judges regard the presence of this factor in 
a passing off case as relevant. Had it been possible to 
examine the facts of these cases in greater detail, it would 
have been apparent that relief may not have been granted as 
readily as it was had the defendants' actions not been 
deliberately dishonest. 
The slightly more difficult conclusion to substantiate is 
that an undue emphasis is being placed on this factor. Only 
four cases relied upon the principle that proof of an intent 
to deceive implies success in that aim. Dismissing the 
notion that in the other twelve cases the same principle was 
relied upon subconsciously, it can be said with some conviction 
that the defendant's improper intention was an overall factor 
relevant either as evidence standing by itself or as an indicator 
of the approach to be adopted in interpreting the facts and the 
law. 
Bearing in mind that passing off is unfair competition 
par excellence, it is submitted that the significance accorded 
to unfair intent is not uncalled for, even though in strict 
passing off terms it is not required. It is a strong 
indication that the courts will not allow unfair competition 
to proceed unchecked. 
75. 
But to those purists who object to this development, it 
can be said that the proposed adoption of legislation 
modelled on the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) 
will be likely to obviate the need to take this development 
any further. 
2. Passing off through imitation of get-up 
Further indications of the fight against unfair competition 
can be gleaned from the nine cases in which it was solely 
the get-up of the goods which was allegedly being passed 
off.
206 
The tort lies in representing through imitation of 
the appearance of the plaintiff's goods that the goods of 
the defendant are those of the plaintiff. 
Get-up is usually defined very narrowly by the courts, who 
distinguish between functional and non-functional features 
of the goods. G t . h" h . 1 207 e -up is somet ing extraneous tote artic e: 
If the particular feature is an important 
ingredient in the success of a product, 
the interest in free competition permits 
its imitation [but not if it is ] a mere 
arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress 
for the goods primarily adopted for 
purposes of identification and individuality. 
The idea that functional parts of a product cannot be protected 
by passing off stems from a reluctance to grant a Common Law 
monopoly where the appearance of the goods could be protected 
by copyright law or registration as an industrial design. 
Arguably, if the appearance of goods can be protected under 
these statutes, there is little need for a wider Common Law 
remedy. 
It is partly for this reason that actions based purely on 
the physical get-up of goods rarely succeed. Another 
reason is that whilst it is easy to change a deceptive name, 
208 it may be difficult or expensive to change the get-up of goods. 
The leading overseas cases in which allegations of passing off 
of get-up have succeeded involve products sold to consumers 
h . h . 11 . 209 .d . 210 w o were eit er i iterate or who di not read English. 
Relief was granted in six of the nine New Zealand cases 
211 involving passing off of get-up alone. In four of these, 
the defendant's improper intention was considered relevant. 
In three of the four cases where relief was refused, the 
defendant's intention did not appear improper. 212 
It should be noted that in both Plix Products Ltd. v. 
Skyler Packaging Ltd. and Ors. 213 and Plix Products Ltd. v. 
Elmark Industries Ltd., 214 which concerned alleged passing off 
of kiwifruit trays by imitation of their size, shape and 
general appearance, the get-up of the trays was, it is 
submitted, a functional feature. While relief was refused 
in Elmark it was granted in Skvler. The interesting point 
to note is that the defendant's intention was considered 
215 relevant in Skyler, whereas it was not discussed in Elmark. 
In Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd. v. Allied Foods Ltd., 
relief was granted to restrain imitation of the plaintiff's 
bread bags, even though Vautier J. found that there was an 
enormous variety of different breads on the New Zealand market, 
all in similar packaging. His Honour considered that general 
market conditions were such that this passing off of get-up 
should be restrained.
216 This finding appears contrary to 
the established principle that no trader can acquire a 
monopoly over a mode of packaging that is "common to the 
trade 11 •
217 It also conflicts with the authorities 
establishing that there is no passing off if the defendant 
has, by labelling, distinguished his or her goods.
218 
Similarly, in Character Developments Ltd. v. Jackpot 
Promotions Ltd.
219 and in Regan v. Grant, relief was granted 
despite the fact that the defendants' goods were labelled, 
although in the latter case this was said not be a decisive 
factor.
220 
Although in these cases the get-up of the goods could 
theoretically have been protected under the statutory body 
of intellectual property law (for example, under the Copyright 
Act 1962 or the Designs Act 1953), it is significant that the 
unfair competition of another trader was sought to be enjoined 
by means of an action for passing off. Despite the accepted 
principle that it is rare for passing off of get-up to be 
successfully restrained, it is also significant that in two 
thirds of the New Zealand get-up cases the relief sought 
should have been granted. This is apart from those other 
cases in which the goods themselves as well as their get-up 
were allegedly being passed off. 
Slight though it may be, this is further evidence of the 
readiness to enjoin unfair competition. 
78. 
3. Common field of activity 
That the New Zealand cases support at least a general 
doctrine of unfair competition is further reinforced by the 
fact that, with the possible exception of the Crusader Oil 
case, the principal parties to each case were in fact 
competitors. Although on the whole, competitors are the 
traders most likely to sue for passing off, passing off can 
affect traders other than competitors and they may bring an 
action to restrain this conduct. 
The traditional requirement of a common field of activity 
between the litigating traders was absent from the Advocaat 
formulation of the tort and is now generally accepted to have 
been dismantled in the law of passing off. 221 It is now 
regarded as being simply a matter bearing on whether or not 
confusion and deception of the public has been established. 
Apart from two cases, the New Zealand courts do not appear 
to be requiring a common field of activity either. It is 
submitted that as regards the requirement, the court in these 
two cases was operating under somewhat of a misconception as 
to the present state of the law. 
In Shotover Gorge Jetboats Ltd. v. Marine Enterprises Ltd., 
the plaintiff company commenced proceedings only once the 
two services were operating on the same waters of the Shotover 
River. Hardie Boys J. rejected the defence of acquiescence 
on the ground that any earlier proceedings would have been 
met with the contention that the two businesses were not in 
79. 
. . 222 competition. The interim injunction granted to the 
plaintiff prevented the defendant from using the name "Lower 
Shotover Jet" only in its operations on that same part of the 
river used by the plaintiff. Elsewhere on the river it could 
still use that name because, as the plaintiff acknowledged, 
the defendant's operations there did not compete with the 
plaintiff's. 
So Hardie Boys J. was requiring not only a common field of 
activity, but also direct competition. But surely with the 
parties operating in the same geographical area a similar 
service, the appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiff's 
distinctive name anywhere in the area would be likely to confuse 
or deceive the public. An association between the two 
businesses would be the obvious conclusion and this could be 
damaging to the plaintiff's goodwill. 
In the Crusader Oil case, Jeffries J. found it necessary to 
state his acceptance of the fact that, despite distinctions 
between oil and mineral exploration, the parties' field of 
223 activity was very close. He also made the express finding 
that the defendant's intention in the future was to compete 
with the plaintiffs.
224 However, as already seen, His 
Honour did not consider the distinctions important on the 
particular facts of the case. The implication is that had 
the circumstances been slightly different, the separate 
fields of commercial activity may have constituted a bar to 
the grant of relief against passing off. This is supported 
b ' I 1 d • d 225 y His Honours cone u ing wor s: 
80. 
Is not such a company entitled to feel 
at considerable risk it might suffer 
damage when another company operating 
in the same field uses [its name ] ? 
(Emphasis added). 
Even if misconstruing the common field of activity factor, 
Shotover Gorge and Crusader Oil at least show that passing 
off is an avenue of relief for aggrieved competitors and 
further, as has been seen, support the majority of other cases 
in showing that it is a remedy for unfair competition. 
4. The sufficiency of passing off 
The foregoing analysis reveals how the New Zealand courts have 
felt able to grant relief against what amounts to no more than 
unfair competition. As a question of morality and fairness, 
it can hardly be said that the result in any case was unjust. 
To achieve justice, the courts have not considered the scope 
of a passing off action to be unduly restrictive. On the 
contrary, it has been perceived as a f lexible instrument of 
economic regulation. Because of this, and despite 
opportunities for doing so, no judge has ventured into the 
realms of a separate tort of unfair competition. 
Although it would be desirable for the peace of mind of 
acadaemia and for the sake of consistency with other Common 
Law jurisdictions to have the status of this somewhat nebulous 
tort authoritatively settled by judicial pronouncement, the 
writer is in entire agreement with the approach of our courts. 
The nature of a passing off action is undergoing change in 
New Zealand and this is not necessarily undesirable. 
However, to prevent further distortion, the adoption in 
New Zealand of proposed trade practices legislation is to 
be welcomed. 
IV PASSING OFF AND PROPOSED NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION 
The importance which the Common Law courts attach to the 
desirability of avoiding a situation where members of the 
public are likely to be deceived or confused 226 is paralleled 
in several jurisdictions by legislation aimed at achieving the 
same result. 227 
In New Zealand, preparations are currently under way for the 
introduction into Parliament of proposed trade practices or 
"fair trading" legislation. There is a strong likelihood 
of the inclusion within it of the provisions of Part V, 
Division 1, of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth.) . 228 
Despite its heading "Consumer Protection", Part V of the 
Australian Act contains provisions which have been regularly 
relied upon by traders whose goods or services have been or are 
being passed off by another. 
out below: 
The relevant provisions are set 
s.52 (1) A corporation shall not, in trade 
or commerce, engage in conduct that 
is misleading or deceptive or that 
is likely to mislead or deceive. 
s.53 
s.55 
82. 
A corporation shall not, in trade 
or commerce, in connection with 
the supply or possible supply of 
goods or services or in connection 
with the promotion by any means of 
the supply or use of goods or services-
(a) 
(aa) 
(b) 
(c) Represent that the goods or 
services have sponsorship, 
approval, performance 
characteristics, accessories, 
uses or benefits they do not have; 
(d) Represent that the corporation 
has a sponsorship, approval or 
affiliation it does not have; 
A person shall not, in trade or 
commerce, engage in conduct that is 
liable to mislead the public as to 
the nature, the manufacturing process, 
the characteristics,the suitability 
for their purpose or the quantity 
of any goods. 
Section SSA reproduces section 55 in relation to a 
corporation. 
Although section 52 refers only to conduct by a corporation, 
sections 5 and 6 of the Act give it an extended operat ion so 
that in certain circumstances individual non-corporate 
activity is prohibited. 
Contravention of these provisions may result in the order of 
an interlocutory or permanent injunction (section 80) and an 
award of damages (section 82). In addition, section 87 
confers on the court the power to make a large number of 
orders of a kind which could not be made under the general - law. 
For example, it is possible that an order under the section 
1 . d t. . 229 could compe corrective aver 1s1ng. 
83. 
For present purposes, section 52(1) is the most important 
provision. It provides an additional remedy to the private 
tort of passing off. Indeed, although designed as a consumer 
protection measure, in the vast majority of cases it has been 
invoked by "traders seeking to defend private industrial and 
intellectual property rights rather than by plaintiffs 
attempting to vindicate the public interest in the protection 
230 of consumers". The reason why almost all actions under 
section 52 of the Act have been brought by traders alleging 
conduct by trade rivals which was likely to be deceptive 
or misleading to consumers is thought to be the expense of 
litigation. 231 An aggrieved trader will probably have more 
at stake than a mere consumer. Litigation under an 
equivalent New Zealand provision, however, will probably not 
be any less expensive than a passing off action. 
The relationship between sections 52 and 53 and the private 
law tort of passing off were discussed by Stephen J. in the 
leading and first High Court decision on section 52, 
Hornsby Building Information Centre . v. Sydney Building 
Information Centre, in the following terms: 232 
It is, no doubt, somewhat of a novelty that 
a quite extensive jurisdiction in passing 
off actions, traditionally the concern of the 
Supreme Court of the States, should be conferred 
upon the Industrial Court and that this should be 
done by an Act described as one 'relating to certain 
Trade Practices' and by sections not very 
explicitly directed to such a subject matter. 
However this is, I think, but a consequence 
of the very direct relationship which 
necessarily exists between the deception 
of consumers in the course of trade and 
the injury caused by the unfair practices 
of a trade rival. Such deception will 
quite often be the means adopted to 
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produce that injury. Legislation which aims 
at the prevention of the former will at 
the same time tend to put an end to the 
latter. If, moreover, the legislative 
prohibition can be enforced by an 
injunction which 'any other person' may 
seek (see s.80(1)), it then becomes 
possible for a trader, injured by the 
competition of his trade rival, to gain 
a remedy under the Act instead of having 
recourse to civil action by way of proceedings 
for passing off. The remedy in such a case 
will not, as in passing off, be founded 
upon any protection of the trader's 
goodwill but, being directed to prevent 
that very deception of the public which 
is injuring his goodwill, it will never-
theless be an effective remedy for that 
of which he complains. The provisions 
of s.82, ... which allow a person who 
suffers loss by another's act which is 
in contravention of s.52 to recover by 
action the amount of his loss, may render 
the statutory remedy even more complete. 
It is not therefore surprising that, in the Australian 
experience, the same principles developed by the courts in 
relation to passing off should have been held relevant and 
applied in decisions under ·section 52 of the Act. 233 This 
has been so despite strong opposition voiced by the courts to 
the suggestion that section 52 is no more than a statutory 
re-enactment of passing off principles. Indeed, in Taco 
Company of Australia v. Taco Bell Pty. Ltd., Deane and 
Fitzgerald JJ. in the Federal Court referred to the relationship 
between section 52 and passing off and stated that 234 
[t]he indiscriminate importation into 
s.52 cases of principles and concepts 
involved in passing off and the associated 
area of trade mark law is likely to be 
productive of error and to give rise to 
arguments founded on false assumptions. 
Cases under section 52 reveal that the courts have been 
reluctant to abandon their Common Law predilections and 
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that the replacement of the Common Law's caveat emptor 
philosophy with a pro-consumer policy has accordingly been 
235 
frustrated. It has been noted that "in each of the 
decisions in which the tension between protection of 
consumer rights and freedom of competition is referred to, 
the courts resolve the tension in favour of unrestrained 
• • 11 236 competition. 
Only an educated guess can be made as to how the New Zealand 
courts will interpret the equivalents of section 52 and its 
surrounding provisions. That they will probably follow 
the Australian precedent in applying the Common Law principles 
is perhaps pre-empted by the observation of Vautier J. in the 
Budget Rent A Car case that in Australia, Mutual Avis NZ could 
not have acted as it had in New Zealand because its actions 
would have been in breach of section 53 of the Trade 
Practices Act. 
. ·. d 237 His Honour sai : 
It is important to note that in passing 
off actions in Australia since the enact-
ment of this statute the Courts have of 
course to take into account the provisions 
of the statute. 
With respect, it may be doubted whether the latter half of 
this statement is actually correct. Although the statement 
is the wrong way around to support directly the proposition 
being advanced here, the implication of it is that the scope 
of the two causes of action is so similar that passing off 
principles will be highly relevant in decisions under the 
Act in New Zealand. 
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How the New Zealand judges may differ from their Australian 
counterparts, however, is in their interpretation of the 
relevant passing off principles to be applied. As has 
been seen, the New Zealand courts have tended to follow 
the Advocaat approach in being more sensitive to consumer 
protection and unfair competition concerns than to the notion 
of untrammelled competition. Accordingly, even though most 
actions may be brought by traders, the consumer protection 
policy of the Act may not necessarily be frustrated. 
The effect of an equivalent provision to section 52, in 
particular, can be seen from the following comparison which 
has been made of the two causes of action in Australia. 238 
1) Under section 52, consumers may sue to complain of 
passing off by a rival trader by the use of the name or get-up 
of another, or for any conduct constituting passing off; 
whereas at Common Law, only a rival trader or a person who 
can establish the necessary goodwill can sue. 
2) To come within section 52, conduct must mislead or 
deceive, or be likely to mislead or deceive, the public as 
consumers. So the kind of misrepresentations relevant for 
section 52 may in general be narrower than the kind for passing 
off. 
3) Under section 52, it is not neces$ary for a rival trader 
to prove reputation or goodwill or distinctiveness. But if 
the conduct complained of involves a misrepresentation as to 
a trade name or get-up, it may be necessary for him or her 
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to establish these elements in order to convince the court 
that the public has been, or is likely to be, misled or 
deceived. 
4) It is unnecessary in section 52 cases for the court to 
consider whether the traders are engaged in a common field 
of activity, though it is probable that it is unnecessary to 
bl . h h. . . ff . 
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esta is t is in a passing o action. 
5) Discretionary considerations as to the grant of an 
injunction under section 52 are wider and less restricting 
than those in relation to passing off. 
6) A trader can complain about a rival trader misrepresenting 
the rival trader's own goods or services, as a contravention 
of section 52, whereas this type of conduct may still not found 
an action for passing off. 
7) The measure of damages for passing off may be more generous 
than the damages available for breach of section 52. 
The elements of the two causes of action clearly overlap in 
some respects. Generally speaking, the equivalent New 
Zealand provision will afford relief to a wider class of 
complainants and may be an easier action to satisfy than 
passing off. But this will depend on how the courts interpret 
the provision and on whether they continue to treat passing 
off actionsin the same vein as indicated by the recent 
jurisprudence (for example, granting relief more readily 
where the defendant has been motivated by an unfair or 
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dishonest intention). 
It can be postulated that the adoption of a section 52 
equivalent will have a bearing on the number of passing 
off actions brought in the future in New Zealand. In 
Australia, it has not been uncommon for litigants to brin
g 
a double-barrelled action in which they plead infringeme
nt 
of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act as well as pass
ing 
off. However, the enactment of the provision has not e
xpressly 
been found by commentators to have reduced the number of
 
passing off actions instituted. 
But once the statutory remedy is available in New Zealan
d, 
whilst aggrieved traders are most likely to plead as 
many causes of action as possible, strictly speaking the
re 
will be no need to plead passing off as well as breach o
f 
the statutory provision. In this respect it must be 
recalled that the statutory action in Australia has been
 
found to be more accommodating than the private tort act
ion. 
Whether the existence of this statutory remedy for unfai
r 
competition will hinder or precipitate development of an
 
equivalent Common Law tort is debatable. On the one hand, 
there may be no need for a tort of unfair competition if
 
the proposed legislation is enacted. On the other hand, 
it may be considered that the Common Law should reflect 
the 
approach of Parliament. This would certainly ;.1av1:; been
 the 
view adopted by Lord Dipiock, as proved by his comments 
in 
240 
the Advocaat case and cited with approval in subsequent 
89. 
d d 
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New Zealan ec1s1ons. Although the enactment of trade 
practices or "fair trading" legislation will not call for 
rectification of the course which passing off has been 
seen to have taken over recent years in New Zealand, it is 
likely to prevent the tort from becoming too far removed 
from its traditional formulation. 
All in all, in the interests of traders, consumers and the 
sanctity of the tort of passing off, the adoption of legislation 
based on Part V of the Australian Trade Practices Act is to be 
eagerly awaited. 
V CONCLUSION 
It has been attempted in this paper to analyse various aspects 
of and recent trends in the law of passing off in New Zealand. 
Particular reference has been made to the modern nature of 
the tort in the context both of national and international 
trading activity and of a general doctrine of unfair competition. 
It can indeed be said that in New Zealand, passing off is the 
"most protean of torts". The effect on the cause of action 
of proposed fair trading legislation will add a further 
contemporary edge to this description. 
The dramatic increase in passing off litigation since 1979 
has provided ample material upon which to base the views 
advanced herein as to the current and future status of the 
tort in New Zealand. 
90. 
With new products and services being offered to the consuming 
public all the time and competition amongst traders becoming 
increasingly fierce, the goodwill of a business will continue 
to be one of its most valuable intangible assets. As such, 
the need for protection against the deceptive practices of 
other traders will always be strong. Fair trading legislation 
will go a long way towards providing the necessary relief, but 
passing off will nevertheless remain a tort ripe for litigation. 
Whilst the basic ingredients of a passing off action are still 
the same, the recent judicial interpretations of these are 
such that the recipe for success in future actions is no 
longer to be found exclusively in the older decisions of 
New Zealand and other Common Law courts. In particular, the 
recent cases are significant for their confirmation of the 
circumstances in which a foreign trader may sue to restrain 
passing off in New Zealand and for the importance attached to 
a dishonest intention on the part of the defendant. It is 
hoped that this paper has provided some guidance as to these 
and other aspects of the passing off action in New Zealand. 
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Cases numbered 1-29 in the preceding Table, are, in 
chronological order, as follows: 
1. Sutton v. The House of Running Ltd. [1979] 2 NZLR 750. 
2. The New Zealand Farmers' Cooperative Association of 
Canterbury Ltd. v. Farmers Trading Co. Ltd. and Calder 
McKay Co. Ltd. (1979) Unreported, Christchurch Registry, 
A 496/78. 
3. Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. Totara Lodge Ltd. (1980) Unreported, 
Wellington Registry, A 109/80. 
4. Dominion Rent A Car Ltd. v. Papanui Service Station (1965) 
Ltd. and Mutual Rental Cars Ltd. (1981) Unreported, 
Christchurch Registry, A 33/80. 
5. Armoured Transport & Security Services Ltd. and Mayne 
Nickless Ltd. v. Rhino Securities Ltd. and Ors. (1981) 
Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 561/81. 
6. Simon's Bakery Ltd. v. Tiffany Frozen Foods Ltd. (1981) 
Unreported, Christchurch Registry, A 149/81. 
7. Plix Products Ltd. v. Skyler Packaging Ltd. and Ors. 
(1981) Unreported, Napier Registry, A 75/81. 
8. Character Developments Ltd. and Anor. v. Jackpot Promotions 
Ltd. and Ors. (1981) Unreported, Christchurch Registry, 
A 219/81. 
9. Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd. v. Allied Foods Co. Ltd. 
(1982) Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 240/82. 
10. Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd. v. Mutual Rental Cars 
(Auckland) Ltd. and Dominion Rent A Car Ltd. (1982) 
Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 1654/77. 
11. Regan v. Grant and Ors. (1982) Unreported, Wellington 
Registry, A 342/82. 
12. Hills Floorings Ltd. v. Carpet Corner Ltd. (1983) 
Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 289/83. 
13. Hugh Hughes Green v. Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand 
(1983) Unreported, Wellington Registry, A 662/79. 
14. Plix Products Ltd. v. Elmark Industries Ltd. (1983) 
Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 547/83. 
15. Meat Services Ltd. v. John Moses (1983) Unreported, 
Blenheim Registry, A 14/83. 
16. Esanda Ltd. and ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd. v. 
Esanda Finance Ltd. (1983) Unreported, Auckland Registry, 
A 833/83. 
17. Keg Restaurants Ltd. and Ors. v. Brandy's Restaurant 
Tavern Ltd. and Ors (1983) Unreported, Auckland Registry, 
A 1042/83. 
18. Shotover Gorge Jetboats Ltd. v. Marine Enterprises Ltd. 
[1984] 2 NZLR 154. 
19. Lion Breweries Ltd. v. Dominion Breweries Ltd. (1983) 
Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 1157/83. 
20. Johnson & Johnson and Anor. v. The Caxton Printing 
Works Ltd. (1983) Unreported, Wellington Registry, 
A 455/83. 
21. Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd. v. Quality Bakers NZ Ltd. 
(1983) Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 1288/83. 
22. Urban Sports Apparel (NZ) Ltd. v. Urban Sports Apparel 
(Remuera) Ltd. (1984) Unreported, Hamilton Registry, 
A 237/83. 
23. Crusader Oil NL and Anor.v. Crusader Minerals NZ Ltd. 
(1984) Unreported, Wellington Registry, A 156/84. 
24. Budget Rent A Car Systems Pty. Ltd. and Ors. v. Mutual 
Rental Cars Ltd. and Anor. (1984) Unreported, 
Auckland · Registry, A 9/ 84. 
25. Auckland University Students Association Inc. v. 
Tisa-Card Ltd. (1984) Unreported, Wellington Registry, 
A 330/84. 
26. Plix Products Ltd. v. Frank M. Winstone ·(Merchants) Ltd. 
and Ors. Reference unknown but interim injunction refused 
in (1983) Unreported, Auckland Registry, A 1128/83. 
Appeal from grant of injunction dismissed in (1985) 
Unreported, CA 178 / 84. 
27. Sodastream Ltd. and Ors. v. S.W. & M.P. Smith Ltd. 
and Ors. (1985) Unreported, Rotorua Registry, A 20/85. 
28. Noel Leeming Television Ltd. and Ors. v. Noel's Appliance 
Centre Ltd. (1985) Unreported, Christchurch Registry, 
A 102/85. 
29. Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd. v. Harvest Bakeries Ltd. 
and Ors. (1985) Unreported, Auckland Registry, 
A 497/85. Appeal from grant of interim injunction 
dismissed in (1985) Unreported, CA 120/85. 
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